Repeated Elections with Asymmetric Information

Duggan, John

doi:10.1111/1468-0343.00071

Cited by 66 publications

(71 citation statements)

References 3 publications

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“…Our analysis is most closely related to Duggan (2000), who develops the basic theory of repeated citizen-candidate election with incomplete information about candidates' policy preferences. Bernhardt et al (2004) study related issues when politicians face term limits, and more senior politicians can obtain "pork transfers" for their districts from districts with less senior politicians.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Bernhardt et al (2004) study related issues when politicians face term limits, and more senior politicians can obtain "pork transfers" for their districts from districts with less senior politicians. 4 Banks and Duggan (2001) extend Duggan's (2000) analysis to allow for multiple ideological dimensions. Bernhardt and Ingberman (1985) is the first paper to consider informational differences between incumbents and challengers.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

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On the benefits of party competition

Bernhardt

Campuzano

Squintani

et al. 2009

Games and Economic Behavior

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We study the role of parties in a citizen-candidate repeated-elections model in which voters have incomplete information. We first identify a novel "party competition effect" in a setting with two opposing parties. Compared with "at large" selection of candidates, party selection makes office-holders more willing to avoid extreme ideological stands, and this benefits voters of all ideologies. We then allow for additional parties. With strategic voting, citizens benefit most when the only two parties receiving votes are more moderate. With sincere voting, even with three parties, extreme parties can thrive at the expense of a middle party; and whether most citizens prefer two or three parties varies with model parameters.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the benefits of party competition

Bernhardt

Campuzano

Squintani

et al. 2009

Games and Economic Behavior

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“…In selecting policies, representatives typically care not only about winning, but also about their actions while in office, either through their own policy preferences or else in terms of the "effort" expended on their constituents' behalf. With the exception of Barro (1973), electoral accountability models assume some form of incomplete information is present: either the motivations of the representatives are known but their influence over policy, and hence over voter utility, is not (Ferejohn 1986, Austen-Smith andBanks 1989), or their influence over policy is known but their motivations are not (Reed 1994, Duggan 2000, Bernhardt et al 2004, Meirowitz 2007, or neither is known (Rogoff 1990, Banks and Sundaram 1993, 1998, Coate and Morris 1995, Fearon 1999. To date, all of this work has maintained the original Downsian assumption of a unidimensional policy space, conceptualized either as a space of effort levels or as an ideological dimension.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Dynamic Model of Democratic Elections in Multidimensional Policy Spaces

Banks

Duggan

2008

QJPS

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We propose a general model of repeated elections. In each period, a challenger is chosen from the electorate to run against an incumbent politician in a majority-rule election, and the winner then selects a policy from a multidimensional policy space. Individual policy preferences are private information, whereas policy choices are publicly observable. We prove existence and continuity of equilibria in "simple" voting and policy strategies; we provide examples to show the variety of possible equilibrium patterns in multiple dimensions; we analyze the effects of patience and office-holding benefits on the persistence of policies over time; and we identify relationships between equilibrium policies and the core of the underlying voting game. As a byproduct of our analysis, we show how equilibrium incentives may lead elected representatives to make policy compromises, even when binding commitments are unavailable. We provide an informational story for incumbency * This paper was presented under the title "A Multidimensional Model of Repeated Elections" in seminars at Columbia, Cornell, MIT, NYU, and Yale, at the

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“…As pointed by Duggan (2000) the downsian model of elections, which is the basis of most models trying to explain levels of redistribution, relies on two very strong assumptions. The first is that politicians have no personal policy preferences and all they care about is implementing whatever policies would get them elected.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Second, given this office motivation, they can make credible commitments to these policies during campaigns. Similar to Duggan (2000), I model politicians with policy preferences just like voters, and allow them to be motivated by both office and policy.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Inequality, Uncertainty, and Redistribution

Machado

2011

SSRN Journal

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For centuries it has been believed that the extension of the franchise in unequal societies would lead to relatively high levels of redistribution. According to international rankings, however, among the fourteen most unequal countries in the world, nine have been democratic for at least the past fourteen years. A prerequisite for the adoption of redistributive policies is that there be elected representatives who are either committed to or who have an incentive to advocate for such policies. The prospects of such an outcome depend not only on candidates personal policy preferences and motivations, but also how they are perceived by voters. One important feature shared by highly unequal democracies is that they tend to be relatively young, with many new parties and candidates in the political scene. This means elections occur under a high degree of uncertainty about critical information voters need to chose their delegates. Thus, in this paper I develop a model of elections as a game of incomplete information to explore how uncertainty, candidates' motivation (policy vs. office), and beliefs about their ideological inclinations affect what policy interests are likely to be represented in the political process. I explore the model's assumptions and outcomes empirically using individual level data for each presidential election in Brazil since democratization.

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Repeated Elections with Asymmetric Information

Cited by 66 publications

References 3 publications

On the benefits of party competition

On the benefits of party competition

A Dynamic Model of Democratic Elections in Multidimensional Policy Spaces

Inequality, Uncertainty, and Redistribution

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