Replication in Experimental Economics: A Historical and Quantitative Approach Focused on Public Good Game Experiments

Vallois, Nicolas; Jullien, Dorian

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2990989

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 55 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…The public goods game (PGG) simply and effectively models the phenomenon of conflict between individual and collective benefit [1], making it a commonly used basis for experimental design in research on social dilemma problems [2]. Facilitating cooperation is crucial to managing social dilemmas and promoting collective benefits in human society.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The signaling role of feedback in the repeated public goods game: Experimental evidence from the laboratory

Liu,

Tsai,

Chen

et al. 2024

PLoS ONE

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper empirically examines the signaling role of feedback in the repeated public goods game. To eliminate the potential impact of feedback’s informative function, we test whether the provision of detailed yet redundant feedback leads to increased contributions. Our findings demonstrate that redundant information significantly promotes contributions. Given the equal informative power in both treatments, the observed increase in contributions can be attributed to the signaling effect. Furthermore, an examination of cooperative disposition heterogeneity reveals that conditional cooperators primarily utilize feedback for its informative function, while free riders primarily exploit it for its signaling function. These results offer empirical evidence of the signaling function of feedback and offer valuable insights into the design of feedback provision in repeated public goods settings.

show abstract

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The signaling role of feedback in the repeated public goods game: Experimental evidence from the laboratory

Liu,

Tsai,

Chen

et al. 2024

PLoS ONE

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Exploitative Abuse and Abuse of Economic Dependence: What Can We Learn from the Industrial Organization Approach?

2017

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This article conducts a detailed analysis of the concept of economic dependence and exploitative abuse based on how their treatment in competition law and economics and their enforcement in European case law have evolved. Although the theoretical roots of these concepts lie in economic theory, these issues have been ignored or considered only scantily in the context of competition law enforcement. An effects-based approach should take these problems into account and could provide insights into how to portray the impacts of these abuses. We draw on two examples-from the agri-food industries and the digital economy-of relevant economic dependence issues. This paper highlights the existence of a paradox: although industrial organization models provide relevant tools to characterize these abuses, assess their effects, and devise remedies, it seems that they are seldom used by competition law enforcers.

show abstract

Replication in Experimental Economics: A Historical and Quantitative Approach Focused on Public Good Game Experiments

Cited by 2 publications

References 55 publications

The signaling role of feedback in the repeated public goods game: Experimental evidence from the laboratory

The signaling role of feedback in the repeated public goods game: Experimental evidence from the laboratory

Exploitative Abuse and Abuse of Economic Dependence: What Can We Learn from the Industrial Organization Approach?

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About