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Brinck, Ingar; Liljenfors, Rikard

doi:10.1002/icd.1788

Cited by 2 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…For example, Proust (2007) developed a model of implicit metacognition considered as an adaptive control system consisting of regulated and regulating subsystems, which does not require the involvement of metarepresentation. Elaborating further along partly similar lines, Brinck and Liljenfors (2013a, b) differentiated between implicit metacognition, perceptual metacognition, and metarepresentational metacognition. Implicit and perceptual metacognition are assumed to rely on heuristics and environmental affordances, without any use for algorithms and metarepresentations.…”

Section: The Development Of Mentalization and Its Dimensionsmentioning

confidence: 76%

“…The mentalization literature contains no application of the implicit/explicit distinction to metacognition. Models of implicit metacognition have, however, been outlined by Proust (2007) and Brinck and Liljenfors (2013a, b). Further, the latter writers have suggested that primary intersubjectivity plays a role in the development of metacognition.…”

Section: Intersubjectivity and Mentalizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Mentalization and intersubjectivity towards a theoretical integration.

Liljenfors¹,

Lundh²

2015

Psychoanalytic Psychology

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The introduction of the concept of mentalization in psychological science by Fonagy and colleagues has opened up new perspectives for the understanding of psychopathology, psychotherapy, and child development. The present study reviews the theory of mentalization, with a focus on its 4 dimensions (cognitive/affective, implicit/explicit, self/other, and external/internal), and some unclear points and unresolved issues are identified. Mentalization theory is then contrasted with the theory of primary intersubjectivity, which is often seen as an incompatible approach to the development of social understanding. It is argued that this theory, at least in 1 of its interpretations, is not only compatible with mentalization theory, but may also possibly contribute to the resolution of some problems in mentalization theory. More specifically, it is argued that mentalization originally develops in the context of primary intersubjectivity, and that primary intersubjectivity is a basic prerequisite for the development of mentalization; but also that there is a considerable overlap between the concepts of primary intersubjectivity and those of implicit and externally focused mentalization.

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Section: The Development Of Mentalization and Its Dimensionsmentioning

confidence: 76%