Report on CFA Clyde demersal fish survey March 2017: summary report to the Clyde Fishermen's Association

Abstract

ForewordThis 'cruise report' is the second of a short series, reflecting the aspiration of the Clyde Fishermen's Association to establish a rigorous sampling scheme to monitor changes in the abundance and distribution of cod and other gadoid species within the Clyde area. The Scottish Oceans Institute was approached to provide independent scientific support in early 2016. A series of surveys was then conducted in 2016, 2017 and 2018. In each survey the SOI provided observers, collected data and wrote up a cruise report detailing the methods used and the location, numbers, weights, sex and maturity states of fish caught. Trials were halted after 2018 firstly because of pressing issues resulting from Brexit which absorbed any potentially available human and other resources, and secondly because of the COVID pandemic. The reports remained as unapproved and incomplete drafts until 2022. Picking up these reports again in 2022, we have responded to reviewers' comments since made by Marine Scotland Science and have finalised all four reports in the 2016-2018 current series.

Financializing urban infrastructure? The speculative state-spaces of ‘public-public partnerships’ in Jakarta

“…The project's derailment also was impacted by local and national politics. At the local level, ‘alignment politics’ played a part, as mayors leveraged their land use permitting powers by bidding to have stations located in their districts, thereby increasing project costs (Horn, 2013). Moreover, given the project's cross-provincial alignment (DKI Jakarta and Banten province), it was controlled by the Ministry of Transport (MOT), and its affiliated SOEs, which hold monopolies over the rail and airport sectors: State-owned Kareta Api Indonesia (KAI) is the de-facto rail operator, while Angkasa Pura (the state-owned airport operator) controls land for the rail's right-of-way rights to access the airport and the depot.…”

“…Moreover, given the project's cross-provincial alignment (DKI Jakarta and Banten province), it was controlled by the Ministry of Transport (MOT), and its affiliated SOEs, which hold monopolies over the rail and airport sectors: State-owned Kareta Api Indonesia (KAI) is the de-facto rail operator, while Angkasa Pura (the state-owned airport operator) controls land for the rail's right-of-way rights to access the airport and the depot. These SOEs were thus likely to be business partners in any PPP venture, which potential private investors would have to weigh in their decision to participate (Horn, 2013). The project was also subject to influence by elite networks – especially the revolving door between bureaucracy and SOEs: the Minister of Transport (Ignasius Jonan), former director of KAI, pushed to change the project's rail gauge (from standard gauge to narrow gauge) in order to fit with KAI's existing commuter network, which did not fit with the project's business model of having a dedicated rail line for express service (personal interview with SMI, 2018).…”