Representation of intentions: Persisting activation in memory.

Goschke, Thomas; Kühl, Julius

doi:10.1037/0278-7393.19.5.1211

Cited by 381 publications

(554 citation statements)

References 66 publications

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“…Consistent with Goschke and Kuhl's (1993) results, there was no difference in RTs to neutral and to script items when the intention was observed. After performing a script, however, the participants responded more slowly to items from that script than to neutral script items.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 79%

“…This finding supports the hypothesis that finished prospective memory intentions undergo deactivation (Marsh et al, 1998). The hypothesis that finished intentions are quickly deactivated stems from research reporting the intention superiority effect (Goschke & Kuhl, 1993). In this paradigm, participants typically learn two scripts (e.g., the steps for setting a table), one that they are instructed they will perform (or, in a control condition, observe the experimenter perform) and one that they will not perform (the neutral script).…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 58%

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Evidence for spontaneous retrieval of suspended but not finished prospective memories

2009

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McDaniel and Einstein (2007) argued that prospective memories can be retrieved through spontaneous retrieval processes stimulated by the presence of a target cue. To test this claim, we investigated whether presenting a prospective memory cue during a task that did not require an intention to be performed spontaneously triggered remembering of that intention. In two experiments, participants performed an image-rating task in which a prospective memory task (to press the "Q" key when a target word appeared) was embedded. Then, participants were told that their intention was finished or suspended. Finally, participants performed a lexical decision task in which each target (and a matched control) word appeared. RTs were slower to target words than to control words when the intention was suspended but not when it was finished. These results suggest that target cues associated with suspended intentions can spontaneously trigger remembering but that finished intentions are quickly deactivated.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 79%

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 58%

Evidence for spontaneous retrieval of suspended but not finished prospective memories

2009

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“…Stimuli on the prospective list were responded to more quickly than were stimuli on the neutral list if participants intended to carry out the actions on the prospective list after the assessment of response latencies (Dockree & Ellis, 2001;Goschke & Kuhl, 1993;Marsh et al, 1998;Marsh et al, 1999). If participants, however, intended to observe the experimenter executing the actions (Goschke & Kuhl, 1993;Marsh et al, 1998), or if they were asked to verbally recall the actions (Freeman & Ellis, 2003), response latencies were comparable for the stimuli on the prospective and the neutral lists. In order to explain this pattern of findings, we suggest that the types of laboratory-based tasks differed with regard to the degree of commitment to realizing the intention.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…First, in studies comparing an enactment and an observation task (Goschke & Kuhl, 1993;Marsh et al, 1998), the incentive to fulfill the enactment task properly was higher than that to fulfill the observation task. For the enactment task, task requirements were clearly defined (enact a list of specified actions), and task realization resulted in an observable outcome that could be evaluated by the experimenter (e.g., how many or in which order actions were performed).…”

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confidence: 99%

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On the representation of intentions: Do personally relevant consequences determine activation?

Schult

Steffens

2011

Mem Cogn

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The intention-superiority effect describes shorter latencies for reactions to stimuli intended for future enactment, relative to stimuli associated with no enactment or canceled enactment. Previous attempts to demonstrate an intention-superiority effect for other types of tasks-for instance, observing the experimenter executing actionshave not yielded an intention-superiority effect. A reason for this could be that the typical enactment task was associated with a higher degree of personal relevance than were other laboratory-based tasks and that task importance or its consequences heighten the accessibility of intentionrelevant materials. In two experiments, we demonstrate an intention-superiority effect for different types of tasks (e.g., monitoring a video clip) when task realization has personally relevant consequences in terms of a performance evaluation. In contrast, we found no intention-superiority effect when future enactment had no personally relevant consequences for participants. These findings imply that the intention-superiority effect is not restricted to actions but occurs generally for relevant plans.

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How We Do What We Want: A Neuro‐Cognitive Perspective on Human Action Planning

Hommel

2006

Planning in Intelligent Systems

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Humans perform actions to reach particular goals, that is, to intentionally create or modify personally relevant events-we move our eyes to learn more about a novel event, reach for a cup to quench our thirst, and move our lips to share our thoughts with someone else. Accordingly, even primitive actions must involve some kind of planning, some sort of anticipatory control. Indeed, there are at least three defining features that the simplest behavioral acts share with more complex ones. First, all of them are planned in terms of anticipated goal events. In particular, the first step of action planning consists in specifying the features the action is intended to possess; this is achieved by activating the appropriate action-effect codes, i.e., sensory-motor assemblies controlling the production of those features. Action-effect codes emerge through the perception of movement-effect contingencies, and they are acquired from the first months in life on. Besides action planning they are involved in the perception of both one's own actions and actions of others. Second, selected features of an intended action need to be integrated into a coherent, durable action plan, which is achieved by temporarily "binding" distributed feature codes. Third, planning an action turns the cognitive system into a kind of reflex machinery, which facilitates the proper execution of the plan under appropriate circumstances. This involves the implementation of automatic stimulus-response associations and the increase of the salience of action-related situational information, thereby delegating action control to the environment.Neuro-cognition of action planning -3

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Representation of intentions: Persisting activation in memory.

Abstract: We are indebted to Arno Fuhrmann for his assistance in all phases of Experiment 3. We would also like to thank Susanne Dibbelt and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful suggestions and their thoughtful and constructive criticism of an earlier version of this article.

Cited by 381 publications

References 66 publications

Evidence for spontaneous retrieval of suspended but not finished prospective memories

Evidence for spontaneous retrieval of suspended but not finished prospective memories

On the representation of intentions: Do personally relevant consequences determine activation?

How We Do What We Want: A Neuro‐Cognitive Perspective on Human Action Planning

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