Representation of Principled Connections: A Window Onto the Formal Aspect of Common Sense Conception

Abstract

Nominal concepts represent things as tokens of types. Recent research suggests that we represent principled connections between the type of thing something is (e.g., DOG) and some of its properties (k-properties; e.g., having four legs for dogs) but not other properties (t-properties; e.g., being brown for dogs). Principled connections differ from logical, statistical, and causal connections. Principled connections license (i) the expectation that tokens of the type will generally possess their k-properties, (ii) formal explanations (i.e., explanation of the presence of k-properties in tokens of a type by reference to the type of thing it is), and (iii) normative expectations concerning the presence of k-properties in tokens of the type. The present paper investigates the hypothesis that representing principled connections requires representing properties as aspects of being the relevant kind of thing (Aspect Hypothesis). Experiment 1 provides a direct test of the Aspect Hypothesis. Experiments 2 and 3 provide indirect tests of the Aspect Hypothesis. All three experiments provide support for the Aspect Hypothesis. Experiment 4 investigates a prediction of the Aspect Hypothesis concerning the manner in which formal explanations are licensed by principled connections. Finally, Experiment 5 investigates a prediction of the Aspect Hypothesis concerning the nature of the normative expectations licensed by principled connections. Together these results provide strong evidence for the idea that representing principled connections involves representing a property as being an aspect of being a given kind of thing. The results also help clarify the manner in which formal explanation differs from other modes of explanation. Finally, the results of the experiments are used to motivate a proposal concerning the formal structure of the conceptual representations implicated by principled connections. This structure provides a domain-general way of structuring our concepts and embodies the perspective we take when we think and talk of things as being instances of a kind.

How language shapes the cultural inheritance of categories

“…That is, labels and generics imply that a feature linked to a category not only is but also should be (62,63). This is particularly so for generic language, which expresses norms that may even compete with statistical observations: "Boys don't cry" is deemed true-despite being demonstrably falsebecause it expresses a norm (64)(65)(66). Similarly, generics such as "Scientists care about the truth" express abstract values rather than descriptively accurate features (67).…”

Do all ducks lay eggs? The generic overgeneralization effect

“…A further question is whether this effect would be found for all types of generics, or whether it is more limited in scope. Generics are often used to express essential properties of a kind (Gelman, 2003;Gelman, 2010;, or properties that bear a principled connection to the kind (Prasada & Dillingham, 2006;Prasada & Dillingham, 2009); for example ''tigers are striped'', ''horses have hooves'', ''doctors heal people''. Prasada and Dillingham (2006), Prasada and Dillingham (2009) define the notion of a principled connection so as to include only properties that are expected to be highly prevalent among members of the kind.…”

“…Generics are often used to express essential properties of a kind (Gelman, 2003;Gelman, 2010;, or properties that bear a principled connection to the kind (Prasada & Dillingham, 2006;Prasada & Dillingham, 2009); for example ''tigers are striped'', ''horses have hooves'', ''doctors heal people''. Prasada and Dillingham (2006), Prasada and Dillingham (2009) define the notion of a principled connection so as to include only properties that are expected to be highly prevalent among members of the kind. However, generics such as ''ducks lay eggs'' and ''lions have manes'' seem to express essential properties in the sense of Medin and Ortony (1989) and Gelman (2003), and otherwise resemble principled properties, despite predicating properties that are only true of mature members of one gender of the kind Leslie, 2007Leslie, , 2008Leslie, Khemlani, Prasada, & Glucksberg, 2009).…”

“…Insofar as they are not used to convey information about a particular individual but rather information about a kind, these statements express generalizations (Carlson, 1977;. Generics have been widely studied by linguists and philosophers, and have recently attracted the attention of psychologists (Chambers, Graham, & Turner, 2008;Gelman, 2003;Gelman & Bloom, 2007;Gelman, Goetz, Sarnecka, & Flukes, 2008;Gelman & Raman, 2003;Gelman, Star, & Flukes, 2002;Gelman & Tardif, 1998;Goldin-Meadow, Gelman, & Mylander, 2005;Hollander, Gelman, & Star, 2002;Khemlani, Leslie, Glucksberg, & Rubio-Fernandez, 2007;Prasada & Dillingham, 2006;Prasada & Dillingham, 2009). This paper presents four studies designed to investigate the relationship between people's interpretations of generics and their interpretations of the quantifiers ''all'' and ''some''.…”

Conceptual Combination, Property Inclusion, and the Aristotelian-Thomistic View of Concepts

“…(Spalding and Gagné 2013), for example, discuss how the A-T approach fits well with a wide variety of evidence drawn from modern psychological research on concepts, including evidence for prototypes and exemplars, as well as work on generics and essentialism, the relation between human and non-human animals' abilities to deal with categories, and other recent research topics in concepts. We should also note here that (Prasada and Dillingham's 2009) notion of K-properties (i.e., properties that are indicative of a kind of thing) is explicitly Aristotelian, though they do not explicitly make use of the rest of the A-T approach to cognition. Pustejovsky (1995) incorporates a version of the four Aristotelian causes in his "qualia" structure for lexical items.…”