Representation Theorems and the Foundations of Decision Theory

Meacham, Christopher J. G.; Weisberg, Jonathan

doi:10.1080/00048402.2010.510529

Cited by 44 publications

(25 citation statements)

References 36 publications

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“…This is the central point of a recent paper by Meacham & Weisberg [31] (see also [11], [12]). But there are also no arguments in the literature to suggest we cannot develop such a theorem, and I have explained already why I think it would be valuable to do so.…”

Section: Representation Theorems: What We Want Versus What We've Gotmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Representation Theorem for Frequently Irrational Agents

Elliott

2016

J Philos Logic

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The standard representation theorem for expected utility theory tells us that if a subject's preferences conform to certain axioms, then she can be represented as maximising her expected utility given a particular set of credences and utilities-and, moreover, that having those credences and utilities is the only way that she could be maximising her expected utility (given her preferences). However, the kinds of agents these theorems seem apt to tell us anything about are highly idealised, being (amongst other things) always probabilistically coherent with infinitely precise degrees of belief and full knowledge of all a priori truths. Ordinary subjects do not look very rational when compared to the kinds of agents usually talked about in decision theory. In this paper, I will develop an expected utility representation theorem aimed at the representation of those who are neither probabilistically coherent, logically omniscient, nor expected utility maximisers across the board-that is, agents who are frequently irrational. The agents in question may be deductively fallible, have incoherent credences, limited representational capacities, and fail to maximise expected utility for all but a limited class of gambles.

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Section: Representation Theorems: What We Want Versus What We've Gotmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Representation Theorem for Frequently Irrational Agents

Elliott

2016

J Philos Logic

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“…Meacham and Weisberg [73] raise a dilemma for decision theoretic representation theorems. On the one hand, if the constraints on basic comparisons are taken as claims about actual people then-at least in the case of the usual constraints on preferences-there is a wealth of empirical evidence against them [50].…”

Section: Representation Theoremsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Foundations of Probability

Briggs

2015

J Philos Logic

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“…Even so: it is highly controversial that representation theorems really do afford anything like a demonstration of correctness for standard decision theory. In a recent paper, Meacham and Weisberg () have mounted a persuasive case to the effect that representation theorems are unfit to play the foundational role that has often been attributed to them. Without pursuing the point further here, I take it that the worries raised by Meacham and Weisberg cast serious doubt on the idea that an appeal to representation theorems gives standard decision theory a leg up over its non‐classical rivals, even if similar theorems turn out not to be provable for non‐standard decision theories.…”

Section: Regress or Not To Regressmentioning

confidence: 99%

How Tolerant Can You Be? Carnap on Rationality

Steinberger

2015

Philos Phenomenol Research

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In this paper I examine a neglected question concerning the centerpiece of Carnap's philosophy: the principle of tolerance. The principle of tolerance states that we are free to devise and adopt any well-defined form of language or linguistic framework we please. A linguistic framework defines framework-internal standards of correct reasoning that guide is in our first-order scientific pursuits. The choice of a linguistic framework, on the other hand, is an 'external' question to be settled on pragmatic grounds and so not itself constrained by these (framework-internal) standards. However, even if choosing a framework is a practical matter, we would nevertheless expect the process of framework selection to be subject to rational norms. But which norms might those be? And where do they come from? I begin by showing that these questions are crucial to the success of Carnap's entire philosophical project. I then offer a response on behalf of the Carnapian which guarantees the rationality of the process of framework selection, while remaining true to Carnap's firm commitment to tolerance. * I am grateful to

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Representation Theorems and the Foundations of Decision Theory

Cited by 44 publications

References 36 publications

A Representation Theorem for Frequently Irrational Agents

A Representation Theorem for Frequently Irrational Agents

Foundations of Probability

How Tolerant Can You Be? Carnap on Rationality

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