Representational Role, Constituency Opinion, and Legislative Roll-Call Behavior

Case Visibility and the Electoral Connection in State Supreme Courts

“…As citizens typically only have well-formed opinions on the most salient issues, judges will likely sense a longer electoral leash on cases that are not highly salient. This notion is supported by a broader literature showing that elected officials are more responsive on highly salient (visible) issues (e.g., Burstein, 2002Burstein, , 2003Kuklinski & Elling, 1977;Kuklinski & McCrone, 1980;Manza & Cook, 2002;Page & Shapiro, 1983;Wlezien, 2004). This condition thus reinforces our expectation that judicial responsiveness will be most pronounced on highly visible issues.…”

“…The prevailing, although not isolated, theory to explain this motivation comes from a rational choice perspective: single-minded seekers of reelection will pursue electoral goals and make policy choices accordingly (Fenno, 1973;Mayhew, 1974). The linkage of constituency opinion and representative behavior has been primarily scrutinized in the congressional literature, as Miller and Stokes's (1963) classic study became the first of many attempts to determine the extent to which representative behavior measurably reflects the opinions of the electorate (see also Erikson, 1978;Kuklinski & Elling, 1977;Page & Shapiro, 1983;Stimson et al, 1995;among many others). Of course, given that any electorally minded politician should theoretically share such motivation, scholars have extended the discussion to include assessments of all political leaders, including the executive branch (e.g., Druckman & Jacobs, 2006;Erikson, MacKuen, & Stimson, 2002;Kingdon, 1984).…”

Balancing constituency representation and party responsiveness in the US Senate: the conditioning effect of state ideological heterogeneity

“…As Kingdon (1989) further elaborates, if there is general agreement in the constituency, the legislator's decision to support its preferences is an easy one. Relatively homogeneous districts send relatively stronger signals to legislators because many constituents hold similar views (Kuklinski and Elling 1977). As a result, with much to gain electorally, legislators in relatively homogeneous districts should place substantial weight on their constituencies' average views.…”

“…The link between citizens and their elected officials is a defining characteristic of any political system, and it has received considerable attention in the study of American politics (e.g., MacRae 1952; Miller and Stokes 1963;Kuklinski and Elling 1977;Achen 1977Achen , 1978McCrone and Kuklinski 1979;Erikson et al 1993Erikson et al , 2002Canes-Wrone et al 2002;Hogan 2008). Most of the scholarship examining the impact of citizen preferences on representatives' behavior focuses on whether and when legislators respond to the average views of citizens in their districts.…”

Institutions and Representational Roles in American State Legislatures

“…These role orientations are particularly useful in explaining legislative behavior on salient issues where constituents may have well established opinions (Kuklinski and Elling 1977;McCrone and Kuklinski 1979). For instance, Lipinski (2003) argues that the rhetoric a legislator uses about representational roles has important implications for how that legislator is viewed by the public.…”