Representationalism in Measurement Theory. Structuralism or Perspectivalism?

Wolff, Johanna

doi:10.4324/9781315145198-7

Cited by 8 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…Then perhaps one is a realist about more than the classification offered by a theory, but also about the structure between members of this classification, which would be reflected in the way various classes are related to perspectival aspects (an argument very similar to the "upward path" towards structural realism (Psillos 2001)). This would bring perspectival realism quite close to structural realism (which is not necessarily a problem, see Wolff (2019)). One could consider that the notion of perspective merely provides an epistemological complement to the structural realist narrative, and explain how the "structure of reality" can be extracted from relations between perspectival representations of real entities.…”

Section: Accuracy Perspectivismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Perspectival realism and norms of scientific representation

Ruyant

2020

Euro Jnl Phil Sci

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Perspectival realism combines two apparently contradictory aspects: the epistemic relativity of perspectives and the mind-independence of realism. This paper examines the prospects for a coherent perspectival realism, taking the literature on scientific representation as a starting point. It is argued that representation involves two types of norms, referred to as norms of relevance and norms of accuracy. Norms of relevance fix the domain of application of a theory and the way it categorises the world, and norms of accuracy give the conditions for the theory to be true. Perspectival realism could be made coherent by taking a realist stance towards one type of norm, and a perspectival stance towards the other, by assuming they are relative to a community. This provides two versions of perspectival realism, called relevance perspectivism and accuracy perspectivism. How each option fares with respect to the challenge of incompatible models is examined. Finally, the prospects of full perspectivism are evaluated.

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Section: Accuracy Perspectivismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Perspectival realism and norms of scientific representation

Ruyant

2020

Euro Jnl Phil Sci

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“…Wolff (2019; offers a reading of RTM, which also emphasises the role of structures. But whereWolff (2020) investigates the metaphysical implications of RTM for our understanding of quantities, the present paper offers a reading of RTM as semantic foundations of numerical representations.9 A more explicit commitment to structuralism by one of the authors of Foundations can be found in Suppes' later book Representation and Invariance of Scientific Structures: "We cannot literally take a number in our hands and apply it to a physical object.…”

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confidence: 99%

The Philosophical Significance of the Representational Theory of Measurement —RTM as Semantic Foundations

Wolff

2023

CRHF

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The Representational Theory of Measurement (RTM), especially the canonical three volume Foundations of Measurement by Krantz et al., is a landmark accomplishment in our understanding of measurement. Despite this, it has been far from easy to pinpoint what exactly we can learn about measurement from RTM, and who the target audience for RTM’s formal results should be. In what sense does RTM provide foundations of measurement, and what is the philosophical significance of such foundations? I argue that RTM provides semantic foundations of measurement, and that their philosophical significance lies in a shift towards structural representation.

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“…Wolff (2019), for instance, provides a compelling case for perspectival realism regarding measurementrelated representation.…”

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confidence: 99%

Representation in measurement

Vessonen

2021

Euro Jnl Phil Sci

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The Representational Theory of Measurement (RTM) is the best known account of the kind of representation measurement requires. However, RTM has been challenged from various angles, with critics claiming e.g. that RTM fails to account for actual measurement practice and that it is ambiguous about the nature of measurable attributes. In this paper I use the critical literature on RTM to formulate Representation Minimalism – a characterization of what measurement-relevant representation requires at the minimum. I argue that Representation Minimalism avoids the main problems with RTM while acknowledging its usefulness as the formal foundation of representation in measurement.

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Representationalism in Measurement Theory. Structuralism or Perspectivalism?

Abstract: Teller, this volume) want to address challenges arising from the plurality of scientific representations of ostensibly the same phenomenon or subject matter while maintaining a broadly realist outlook on science. 2 The plurality

Cited by 8 publications

References 12 publications

Perspectival realism and norms of scientific representation

Perspectival realism and norms of scientific representation

The Philosophical Significance of the Representational Theory of Measurement —RTM as Semantic Foundations

Representation in measurement

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