Representations of Peripheral Space in Iraqi Kurdistan

Abstract

OFFICIAL MEDIA of the leading parties and of the Regional Government of Kurdistan in Iraq describe the cities of Erbil, Dohuk, and Sulaimaniya 1 as sites of economic growth and prosperity in order to legitimate its authority and to invite foreign capital. This policy includes academic representations, forms of "othering", and the use of the international public as a witness to the success. 2 A glance at the official organ of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) can be revealing! On 12 May 2009, for example, Kurdistan-î Nwê presented the headline "World Bank Describes Kurdistan as Development Star in Iraqi Sky. 93% Development in Kurdistan Region". 3 Follows an article based on information from the Sulaimaniya Statistics Directorate, a panorama picture of Sulaimaniya showing new bridges, multi-storey housing complexes and business buildings, and a diagram of Iraq's governorates comparing the economic wealth of Kurdistan to the poverty in other areas-those of "the failed Arabs", as the article suggests. What this article conceals, however, are figures available at the Statistics Directorate that indicate a sharp discrepancy in Kurdistan itself between people in the city and people in the villages. 4 This discrepancy is likewise evident in data provided by the United Nations World Food Programme (UNWFP) in cooperation with Iraqi and Kurdish ministries in 2008. Here, Sulaimaniya city is labelled "better off", whereas certain districts in the governorate of Sulaimaniya are considered "extremely vulnerable" in terms of food security, which is measured by rates of employment, education, income and buying power, expenditure, household assets, access to productive assets, water, and electricity. 5

The value of the homeland: Land in Duhok, Kurdistan‐Iraq, as territory, resource, and landscape

“…In many cases, this was driven by the speculative hope for an even brighter future—people bought land, I was told, because they believed that prices would rise even higher (fieldnotes, April 7, 2014). Investment in rural properties was enhanced by the KRG's policy of “reviving” the rural areas through low‐interest loans aimed at rebuilding the villages that had been destroyed almost entirely by the Ba'athist regime before 1991 (Berwari 2013; Fischer‐Tahir 2011). Yet the ways in which rural land was valued were changing.…”

“…intcid=CNM-00-10abd1h), similar perspectives were echoed in pieces published by the Washington Post(Sly 2011), the BBC, and other prominent international news outlets. At the time of writing (May 2021), a simple internet search with the term "The Other Iraq" retrieved numerous videos and articles dating from the mid-2000s that echo this narrative.6 See AndreaFischer-Tahir's (2003 work on the significance of the concept of "martyrdom" in Iraqi-Kurdish political discourse.7 SeeElden (2013) on the significance of verticality for territorial claims. 8 Citing the Dutch example here is not coincidental, as the Netherlands has been an active and visible agent in Kurdistan's agrarian sector through development activities such as trainings, investments, and scholarly analysis; see, for example,Jongerden et al (2019) andJangiz (2021).9 Markets and profit margins differ according to crop: wheat was usually more profitable than fruit or vegetables, because it was bought at fixed prices by the government (see Eklund and Lange 2018); I was told, however, that even here, the economic crisis led to delayed payments.10 This echoed older Iraqi policy during Ba'athist rule(Woertz 2019; see alsoLange 2016, 216).11Kuruuzum (2018a, chap.…”