Representing pure Nash equilibria in argumentation

Abstract

In this paper we describe an argumentation-based representation of normal form games, and demonstrate how argumentation can be used to compute pure strategy Nash equilibria. Our approach builds on Modgil’s Extended Argumentation Frameworks. We demonstrate its correctness, showprove several theoretical properties it satisfies, and outline how it can be used to explain why certain strategies are Nash equilibria to a non-expert human user.

Resilience, reliability, and coordination in autonomous multi-agent systems

“…For instance, Yun, Vesic and Oren [73] proposed a dialectical framework based on argumentation to compute and explain pure strategy Nash equilibria. Roughly speaking, this framework extends the framework of [74] (allowing attacks on attacks) and models a two-agent dialogue, where the proponent's goal is to show that an argument is a Nash equilibrium while the opponent seeks to demonstrate that the proponent's argument is not a Nash equilibrium by proposing alternatives.…”