Representing territorial diversity: the role of local government associations

Abstract

Local government associations (LGAs) are neglected in the intergovernmental relations and interest group literatures. This article argues that they form a key element in central-local relations. They contribute towards defending local democracy and local discretion through their three roles as the collective voices of local authorities, as countervailing public interest groups in political systems dominated by private interests and as feedback mechanisms for central government actors distant from the localities. LGAs are understood as hybrid organisations, combining governmental and interest group characteristics, and their role and influence analysed in terms of (1) the relationship between central government and LGAs; (2) LGAs' capacity to manage the dilemmas of collectively representing territorial heterogeneity, maintain and even mobilise its membership and deploy its resources; and (3) the extent of competition from other political and functional interests. These roles are illustrated through a comparative analysis of LGAs in England, Germany and the Netherlands.

Accountability, governance, and institutional change in intergovernmental relations: A theoretical framework

“…Jones and Stewart (2012) give numerous examples of this centralist approach in Britain, where, due to historical reasons, politicians in the central government believe that their responsibility for providing local services is much greater than that of local politicians. At the same time, local politicians see themselves as less accountable than national politicians (de Widt & Laffin, 2018).…”

Intergovernmental relations during the COVID-19 crisis in Poland

“…2 Needless to say, such diverse representation from self-government associations causes legitimate questions regarding organisation and mobilisation in their relationship with the central government. Problems associated with collective action are seen by many scholars as a key obstacle to effective IGR (Cigler, 2012;Callanan, 2012;de Widt & Laffin, 2018).…”

Liberalising audit markets for local government: The five forces at work in England and the Netherlands

“…Although the BBV itself was perceived by most interviewed auditors as 'not particularly complicated' , the special accounting features of municipalities resulting from their many revenue and expenditure streams were seen as adding significantly to the technical complexity of municipal audit work. Audit complexity has increased following major decentralisations of social welfare tasks to the Dutch municipal level in 2015 (De Widt & Laffin, 2018). The increased audit complexity has increased cost pressures for auditors and has contributed to a growing number of conflicts between auditors and municipalities about extra charges.…”