Repricing of executive stock options

Abstract

Repricing, Executive stock options, Incentive contracts, Variable accounting charges, Agency costs, G30, G32, G34, G38, J33, L14,

Robust stock option plans

“…andBebchuk et al (2002) Sautner and Weber (2011). provide empirical support for the self-dealing hypothesis by showing that when governance structures are weak, stock option plans are designed in a way that is favored by managers.6 Corresponding models have been developed and analyzed byKulatilaka and Markus (1994), Rubinstein (1995), Carpenter (1998),Hull and White (2004),Ammann and Seiz (2004),Cvitanić et al (2008), andBrisley and Anderson (2008).7 Yang and Carleton (2010) analyze the repricing of executive stock options under new accounting rules in an optimal contracting setting. 8 SeeBettis et al (2005), p. 469.…”