Reproductive Autonomy, the Non‐identity Problem, and the Non‐person Problem

Abstract

The Non-Identity Problem is the problem of explaining the apparent wrongness of a decision that does not harm people, especially since some of the people affected by the decision would not exist at all were it not for the decision. One approach to this problem, in the context of reproductive decisions, is to focus on wronging, rather than harming, one's offspring. But a Non-Person Problem emerges for any view that claims (1) that only persons can be wronged and (2) that the person-making properties allow for there to be human non-persons. Consider an individual human organism that is prevented from ever possessing the person-making properties. On person-only accounts of the victims of wronging, this organism cannot be wronged by anyone. Hence even individuals whose decisions prevent it from ever possessing the person-making properties cannot wrong it. But this is counter-intuitive. We can think of examples where a human organism is wronged by precisely those decisions that prevent it from possessing the person-making properties. The best solution to this problem, in the case where the person-making property is rational self-governance in pursuit of a meaningful life, is to adjust the concept of a person so that it refers, not merely to those with the immediate capacity for rational self-governance in pursuit of a meaningful life, but also to those with a higher-order capacity for such self-governance. Any solution to the Non-Identity Problem that focuses on wronging rather than harming should incorporate this sort of solution to the Non-Person Problem.

Personhood and the Fetus: Settling the Dispute

“…It is important to remember that medical science has long-since accepted that the fetus, even in the embryonic stage, is a living human organism; therefore, this being clearly possesses the innate potentiality for person-making capabilities, regardless of whether or not that potential is ever realized (Joyce, 1978;Disilvestro, 2009). One can see the clarity of this argument when examining the human embryo in comparison to that of another, non-human organism.…”

“…Does it make sense, however, to remove personhood status from an individual that is merely suffering from an irreversible illness? Disilvestro (2009) answers this question quite sufficiently:…”

“…Issues related to reproductive autonomy often stem from what Disilvestro (2009) terms the Non-Person Problem. He argues that individuals often struggle when considering autonomy and harm in regards to an organism that does not currently exist in the moral community -specifically the developing fetus.…”

The living dead? Perception of persons in the unresponsive wakefulness syndrome in Germany compared to the USA

“…Accordingly, there is an ongoing ethical debate whether or not UWS patients should be considered ‘persons’ [ 6 ] and although DiSilvestro et al come to the conclusion that they should, others disagree [ 7 ], implying that there is uncertainty even among the scientific and (medical)-ethics community.…”

“…If so, this could have complex and severe consequences for patients, because, as Waytz showed, with the ascription of mind, moral rights are also conferred [ 8 ]. Conversely, if a person is seen as relatively mindless, we also risk objectifying him or her, consequently denying human rights [ 6 , 10 , 11 ], because the patient is no longer seen as a ‘person’ at all [ 6 ]. Whereas from the scientific point of view, the ‘real’ mental status of a UWS patient cannot yet be conclusively determined [ 12 – 14 ], it seems safe to say, that any living brain should have the capacity to experience more than a dead brain.…”