Reputation and news suppression in the media industry

Abstract

This paper proposes a new argument to explain why media firms silence information that may be relevant to consumers and why this behavior varies across firms. We build on the literature of career concerns and consider firms that seek to maximize their reputation for high quality. Crucial to our results is the idea that media firms can affect, with their reporting strategy, the probability that consumers learn the true state. Reputational concerns dictate that a monopoly firm suppresses scoops, even when evidence is strong. With competition, precise private information is published but weaker though informative signals are silenced. We obtain that silence is higher in media firms with high levels of initial reputation and/or great social influence. We draw predictions on a firm's optimal choice of an editorial standard, the persistence of news suppression when consumers believe one state to be more likely than another and the possibility that silence may be socially beneficial.

Media Bias in China

“…The entry of a commercial paper produces a political cost by reducing the audience of the preexisting Party paper and thus the reach of its propaganda. 2 We argue that it is likely that the lower-level CCPC cares less about the political cost of reduced bias exposure because this cost, such as political unrest, has geographic spillovers that are not fully internalized by the lower-level CCPC. Consistent with this argument, we find that in a sample of 265 prefectures, lower valuation of political control for historical reasons such as exposure to Western powers or influence of the CCP ideology facilitates the entry of commercial papers and hinders the entry of Party papers.…”

Clickbait news and algorithmic curation: A game theory framework of the relation between journalism, users, and platforms

“…Game-theoretic approaches are rarely applied to journalism. One exception demonstrates a leader-follower game, in which reputational news outlets withhold questionable scoops fearing reputation loss, while less reputable outlets cover such scoops (Andina-Díaz and García-Martínez, 2020). We describe the roles of journalists, users, competitors, and social media platforms for clickbait news supply in four scenes that can occur subsequently or simultaneously.…”

“…Journalists consider various aspects for news selection and editing, including audience metrics (Fürst, 2020; Lamot and van Aelst, 2020), competitor content (Boczkowski, 2010), social media content (Cagé et al, 2020), and outlet reputation (Andina-Díaz and García-Martínez, 2020; Siegert et al, 2011). Social media editors or members of the editorial team are involved in editing news for social media (Cornia et al, 2018).…”

“…Introduction 2010), social media content (Cagé et al, 2020), and outlet reputation (Andina-Díaz and García-Martínez, 2020;Siegert et al, 2011). Social media editors or members of the editorial team are involved in editing news for social media (Cornia et al, 2018).…”

The price of silence: Media competition, capture, and electoral accountability

“…The vast political economy literature on media acknowledges the existence of a demand driven media bias as well. See, for example,Strömberg (2004),Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005),Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006),Bernhardt et al (2008),Chan and Stone (2013),Andina-Diaz and Garcia-Martinez (2016). Models of supply driven media bias (but without an explicit model of media capture) are for exampleBaron (2006),Anderson and McLaren (2012),Duggan and Martinelli (2011) and,Hafer et al (2017),Levy et al (2017).12 A different but related type of supply-driven bias is the one induced by advertisers, documented byReuter and Zitzewitz (2006) andGambaro and Puglisi (2015).…”