Reputation-based popularity promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game

Chu, Chen; Zhai, Yongjie; Mu, Chunjiang; Hu, Die; Li, Tong; Ши, Лей

doi:10.1016/j.amc.2019.06.007

Cited by 18 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 40 publications

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“…Along this line, more refined models with multifaceted dynamics involving real-world factors have also been explored. On the one hand, the reputation dynamics could trigger other complex behaviors, resulting in coupling mechanisms that effectively facilitate cooperation, such as reputation-based partner choice [51,52], interaction [53], popularity [54], migration [55] and others [56][57][58]. On the other hand, reputation could directly affect the payoff structure of the game, which can be widely observed in production activities involving team collaboration [59,60].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reputation-based synergy and discounting mechanism promotes cooperation

Zhu,

Wang,

Wang

et al. 2024

New J. Phys.

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A good group reputation often facilitates more efficient synergistic teamwork in production activities. Here we translate this simple motivation into a reputation-based synergy and discounting mechanism in the public goods game. Specifically, the reputation type of a group, either good or bad determined by a reputation threshold, modifies the nonlinear payoff structure described by a unified reputation impact factor. Results show that this reputation-based incentive mechanism could effectively promote cooperation compared with linear payoffs, despite the coexistence of synergy and discounting effects. Notably, the complicated interactions between reputation impact and reputation threshold result in a sharp phase transition from full cooperation to full defection. We also find that the presence of a few discounting groups could increase the average payoffs of cooperators, leading to an interesting phenomenon that when the reputation threshold is raised, the gap between the average payoffs of cooperators and defectors increases while the overall payoff decreases. We further extend our framework to heterogeneous situations and show how the variability of individuals affect the evolutionary outcomes. Our work provides important insights into facilitating cooperation in social groups.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reputation-based synergy and discounting mechanism promotes cooperation

Zhu,

Wang,

Wang

et al. 2024

New J. Phys.

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“…Active mechanisms include those in which cooperative individuals behave conditionally to avoid free-riding-for instance, by determining whether to cooperate based on others' shared genes [43], reputations [44][45][46][47], tags [48], or wealth [49][50][51]. Such active mechanisms also include conditional behavior either to sanction defection (e.g., via punishment [14,[52][53][54][55][56][57][58][59], reciprocating defection with defection [36,60], or discontinuing play [61][62][63]) or to repay cooperation (e.g., via reciprocal altruism and rewards [60,64,65]).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Seeding the Spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma with Ulam’s Spiral

Johnson

2023

Complexity

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Ulam’s spiral reveals patterns in the prime numbers by presenting positive integers in a right-angled whorl. The classic spatial prisoner’s dilemma (PD) reveals pathways to cooperation by presenting a model of agents interacting on a grid. This paper brings these tools together via a deterministic spatial PD model that distributes cooperators at the prime-numbered locations of Ulam’s spiral. The model focuses on a narrow boundary game variant of the PD for ease of comparison with early studies of the spatial PD. Despite constituting an initially small portion of the population, cooperators arranged in Ulam’s spiral always grow to dominance when (i) the payoff to free-riding is less than or equal to 8/6 (≈1.33) times the payoff to mutual cooperation and (ii) grid size equals or exceeds 23 × 23. As in any spatial PD model, particular formations of cooperators spur this growth and here these formations draw attention to rare configurations in Ulam’s spiral.

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“…They suggested that some other factors (e.g. conformity [25][26][27] popularity [28][29][30][31] and reputation [32][33][34], et al) may also influence imitation behavior. Recent years, the impact of success rates on cooperation has been considered.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Success-rate-driven strategy updating enhances cooperation in social dilemmas

Lu,

Dai

2023

New J. Phys.

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Strategy updates play an important role in the evolution of cooperation. In traditional imitation rules, it is assumed that strategic learning is driven by payoff bias. In this study, a modified Fermi rule was proposed, in which payoff and success-rate are synthetically considered to determine players’ strategy updates. It is assumed that individuals have an immediate memory length M, and that success can be measured by using an identical aspiration level a as a benchmark. Success-rate is defined in the frequency that an individual’s payoff equals or exceeds the benchmark a within the memory length M. Numerical simulations conducted by considering the two factors in the strategy update show that cooperation can be facilitated compared to the traditional version. Using the identical aspiration level a as benchmark, the results show that there is a clear phase shift phenomenon in enhancing cooperation. This implies that different b will have an appropriate aspiration interval to achieve optimal cooperation. Moreover, only a moderate immediate memory length can facilitate cooperation. The proposed mechanism is highly robust and can provide valuable insights into the emergence and maintenance of cooperation.

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Reputation-based popularity promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game

Cited by 18 publications

References 40 publications

Reputation-based synergy and discounting mechanism promotes cooperation

Reputation-based synergy and discounting mechanism promotes cooperation

Seeding the Spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma with Ulam’s Spiral

Success-rate-driven strategy updating enhances cooperation in social dilemmas

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