Reputation-based probabilistic punishment on the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game

Quan, Ji; Cui, Shihui; Chen, Wenman; Wang, Xianjia

doi:10.1016/j.amc.2022.127703

Cited by 10 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 55 publications

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“…On the other hand, strategy persistence [46] and second-order evaluation of reputation [47] improve the level of cooperation in the SDG. Furthermore, relevant mechanisms under the PGG have been established to counteract temptation to defect and promote cooperation, such as reputation inference [48], heterogeneous investment [49], probabilistic punishment [50], historical donations [51], and payoff transfers [52], etc. In particular, Perc et al summarize the research on cooperative dilemmas under the mechanism of reputation and reciprocity [53], and study the emergence of cooperative behaviors under reputational preferences [54], moral mechanisms [55] and second-order reputational evaluations [43], which provides a good guideline for our work.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperative emergence of spatial public goods games with reputation discount accumulation

Tang,

Wang,

et al. 2024

New J. Phys.

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To address issues like the tragedy of the commons, reputation mechanisms prove effective in promoting the emergence of cooperative behavior in social dilemmas. Previous research assumed that the increment of reputation is a fixed constant, however, the historical behavior of individuals with time preferences affects their reputation fluctuations on different scales. Inspired by this, we propose a framework for spatial public goods game that incorporates a reputation discount accumulation model with time preferences. In this model, players are classified as either long-sighted players or short-sighted players based on the significance of their historical behavior. Compared with short-sighted players, long-sighted players are more concerned with the impact of historical behaviors on the next game. Simulation results show that long-sighted cooperative players can resist the invasion of short-sighted defectors, and short-sighted defection strategies are eventually replaced by long-sighted cooperative strategies. This indicates that a higher discount factor facilitates the generation and maintenance of cooperation.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperative emergence of spatial public goods games with reputation discount accumulation

Tang,

Wang,

et al. 2024

New J. Phys.

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show abstract

“…Along this line, more refined models with multifaceted dynamics involving real-world factors have also been explored. On the one hand, the reputation dynamics could trigger other complex behaviors, resulting in coupling mechanisms that effectively facilitate cooperation, such as reputation-based partner choice [51,52], interaction [53], popularity [54], migration [55] and others [56][57][58]. On the other hand, reputation could directly affect the payoff structure of the game, which can be widely observed in production activities involving team collaboration [59,60].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reputation-based synergy and discounting mechanism promotes cooperation

Zhu,

Wang,

Wang

et al. 2024

New J. Phys.

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A good group reputation often facilitates more efficient synergistic teamwork in production activities. Here we translate this simple motivation into a reputation-based synergy and discounting mechanism in the public goods game. Specifically, the reputation type of a group, either good or bad determined by a reputation threshold, modifies the nonlinear payoff structure described by a unified reputation impact factor. Results show that this reputation-based incentive mechanism could effectively promote cooperation compared with linear payoffs, despite the coexistence of synergy and discounting effects. Notably, the complicated interactions between reputation impact and reputation threshold result in a sharp phase transition from full cooperation to full defection. We also find that the presence of a few discounting groups could increase the average payoffs of cooperators, leading to an interesting phenomenon that when the reputation threshold is raised, the gap between the average payoffs of cooperators and defectors increases while the overall payoff decreases. We further extend our framework to heterogeneous situations and show how the variability of individuals affect the evolutionary outcomes. Our work provides important insights into facilitating cooperation in social groups.

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Public Goods Game Based on the Combination Model of Reputation and Punishment

Liu

2024

Applied Economics and Policy Studies

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Reputation-based probabilistic punishment on the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game

Cited by 10 publications

References 55 publications

Cooperative emergence of spatial public goods games with reputation discount accumulation

Cooperative emergence of spatial public goods games with reputation discount accumulation

Reputation-based synergy and discounting mechanism promotes cooperation

Public Goods Game Based on the Combination Model of Reputation and Punishment

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