Reputation in Dynamic Games

Celentani, Marco; Pesendorfer, Wolfgang

doi:10.1006/jeth.1996.0078

Cited by 18 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…This assumption brings the model more in line with those in most papers regarding reputation in game theory (Kreps and Wilson 1982, Milgrom and Roberts 1982, Celentani and Pesendorfer 1996.…”

Section: Special Casesmentioning

confidence: 55%

“…In reputation models (such as in Barro and Gordon 1983, Celentani and Pesendorfer 1996, and Cole and Kehoe 1998, good outcomes occur both in finite period models and in infinite period models without explicit history-dependent (or trigger) strategies. In such models, the type of government is unobserved by households and the government's reputation is the household sector's belief (its Bayesian posterior) that the government is of a particular type.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Public trust and government betrayal

Phelan

2006

Journal of Economic Theory

128

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Section: Special Casesmentioning

confidence: 55%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Public trust and government betrayal

Phelan

2006

Journal of Economic Theory

128

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“…This was implicit in the work of Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982), and made explicit in the work of Levine (1989, 1992). Schmidt (1993), Celentani (1991), Celentani and Pesendorfer (1996) ∈ results. The probability of individual outcome y i is denoted…”

Section: The "One-shot" Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible?

Fudenberg

Levine

Pesendorfer

1998

Journal of Economic Theory

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We examine games played by a single large player and a large number of opponents who are small, but not anonymous. If the play of the small players is observed with noise, and if the number of actions the large player controls is bounded independently of the number of small players, then as the number of small players grows, the equilibrium set converges to that of the game where there is a continuum of small players. The paper extends previous work on the negligibility of small players by dropping the assumption that small players actions are "anonymous." That is, we allow each small player's actions to be observed separately, instead of supposing that the small players' actions are only observed through their effect on an aggregate statistic.

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“…12 12 See Fudenberg and Levine (1992), Kreps and Wilson (1982), Celentani and Pesendorfer (1996), Battigalli and Watson (1997), Levine and Martinelli (1998), and Kandori (1992). …”

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confidence: 99%

Reputation, Trust, and Rebates: How Online Auction Markets Can Improve Their Feedback Mechanisms

2010

Economics Manag Strategy

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Trust and trustworthiness are crucial to the survival of online markets, and reputation systems that rely on feedback from traders help sustain trust. However, in current online auction markets only half of the buyers leave feedback after transactions, and nearly all of it is positive. In this paper, we propose a mechanism whereby sellers can provide rebates to buyers contingent on buyers' providing reports. Using a game theoretical model, we show how the rebate incentive mechanism can increase reporting. In both a pure adverse selection model, and a model with adverse selection and moral hazard, there exists a pooling equilibrium where both good and bad sellers choose the rebate option, even though their true types are revealed through feedback. In the presence of moral hazard, the mechanism induces bad sellers to improve the quality of the contract. quires buyers to take missing feedback into consideration, though it is very difficult for an average buyer to get this information. The mechanism proposed in this paper addresses the shortcomings of these existing mechanisms. The objective of this paper is to provide a mechanism for a self-sustaining market, in the sense that only sellers and buyers are involved with minimal transaction costs. We propose giving sellers an option to provide a rebate to cover the reporting cost to a buyer. This will provide an incentive for buyers to provide feedback 1

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Reputation in Dynamic Games

Cited by 18 publications

References 20 publications

Public trust and government betrayal

Public trust and government betrayal

When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible?

Reputation, Trust, and Rebates: How Online Auction Markets Can Improve Their Feedback Mechanisms

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