Reputation risk during dishonest social decision-making modulates anterior insular and cingulate cortex activity and connectivity

Abstract

To explore the neural underpinnings of (dis)honest decision making under quasi-ecological conditions, we used an fMRI adapted version of a card game in which deceptive or truthful decisions are made to an opponent, with or without the risk of getting caught by them. Dishonest decisions were associated to increased activity in a cortico-subcortical circuit including the bilateral anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), anterior insula (AI), left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, supplementary motor area, and right caudate. Crucially, deceptive immoral decisions under reputation risk enhanced activity of - and functional connectivity between - the bilateral ACC and left AI, suggesting the need for heightened emotional processing and cognitive control when making immoral decisions under reputation risk. Tellingly, more manipulative individuals required less involvement of the ACC during risky self-gain lies but more involvement during other-gain truths, pointing to the need of cognitive control only when going against one's own moral code.

Incidental anger and happiness increase intentional self-serving deception: An online study based on an ecological deception task

“…Previous studies have shown that lying behaviour during the TLCG, and specifically egoistic lies, are tightly linked to personality traits of Machiavellianism and social desirability (Dupont et al, 2023;Panasiti et al, 2011). Here, we observed the same type of associations.…”

“…In fact, two key findings have been repeatedly found in studies implementing the TLCG, namely that people tend to lie more for self-gain than for other-gain and that people decrease their self-gain lying behaviour when there is a risk of getting caught (Azevedo et al, 2018;Dupont et al, 2023;Panasiti et al, 2011Panasiti et al, , 2014Panasiti et al, , 2016Schepisi et al, 2020;Vabba et al, 2022). Additionally, participants' deceptive behaviour in reputation risk conditions during the TLCG was found to be associated with personality traits of Machiavellianism and social desirability (Panasiti et al, 2011;Dupont et al, 2023).…”

“…The sample size was chosen on account of a simulation-based power calculation utilizing simr (Green & MacLeod, 2016) in RStudio. The parameters of interests on which to build the simulation (e.g., fixed effects) were taken from results included in a previous study implementing the TLCG -interaction effect between outcome (favourable/unfavourable) and reputation (high risk/low risk) in a generalized linear mixed model with rate of lies as dependent variable (Dupont et al, 2023). The simulation (1000 iterations) revealed that, with an alpha value of 0.05, 40 participants would be sufficient to detect the effect of interest with 80% power.…”

“…The present study utilizes the Temptation to Lie Card Game (TLCG) (Panasiti et al, 2011) to investigate the effects of three incidental emotions, namely anger, gratitude, and happiness, on dishonest decisionmaking. The TLCG is an experimental paradigm developed by our research group (Panasiti et al, 2011), which, compared to classic deception paradigms, includes all three essential components needed to mimic real-life deception (Delgado-Herrera et al, 2021), i.e., the opportunity to lie out of own volition, a monetary reward for lying, and social context (see Azevedo et al, 2018;Dupont et al, 2023;Panasiti et al, 2011Panasiti et al, , 2014Panasiti et al, , 2016Schepisi et al, 2020;Vabba et al, 2022). Crucially, when deciding whether to lie in social situations, people may be confronted with threats to their moral reputation, an essential aspect of individuals' moral integrity (Vonasch et al, 2018).…”

“…Crucially, when deciding whether to lie in social situations, people may be confronted with threats to their moral reputation, an essential aspect of individuals' moral integrity (Vonasch et al, 2018). On this, studies using the TLCG found that people's tendency to tell egoistic lies decreased when they were told their opponent would be informed about their deceptive choices, in other words, when their reputation was at risk (Azevedo et al, 2018;Dupont et al, 2023;Panasiti et al, 2011Panasiti et al, , 2014Panasiti et al, , 2016Schepisi et al, 2020;Vabba et al, 2022).…”