Reputational concerns with altruistic providers

Olivella, Pau; Siciliani, Luigi

doi:10.1016/j.jhealeco.2017.05.003

Cited by 18 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 53 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Urda et al [31] pointed out that altruistic preferences not only affect decision utility functions, but also influence people’s decisions, emotions and behaviors. Olivella et al [32] studied the altruistic preference between doctors and found that when paying more attention to personal reputation, doctors with lower altruism would imitate doctors with higher a preference.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Greenness and Pricing Decisions of Cooperative Supply Chains Considering Altruistic Preferences

Huang

Zhang

Ren

et al. 2018

IJERPH

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

With the development of the economy and science technology, global resource shortages and environmental pressures have become the focus of attention. More and more consumers tend to buy non-polluting and environmentally friendly green products, and many manufacturers and retailers are beginning to produce or sell green products to enhance their competitive advantage in the market. Considering the green preference attributes of consumers, the altruistic preference is introduced into the supply chain, and we establish four models: two cooperative manufacturers and one retailer are completely self-interested, one retailer has altruistic preference, two cooperative manufacturers have altruistic preferences, and two cooperative manufacturers and one retailer have altruistic preferences. We address the optimal greenness and pricing decisions of supply chain members, and analyze the impact of altruistic preferences on supply chain decision-making and profits. The results show that the altruistic preference coefficient can significantly affect the decision-making and the profits of supply chain members, and when two manufacturers and one retailer consider altruistic preferences, the altruistic preference coefficients adopted by the three parties are in the certain ranges, the supply chain members’ altruistic preference coefficients can increase the whole supply chain profit. Through analysis, in the three cases where the retailer has altruistic preferences, two manufacturers have altruistic preferences, and two manufacturers and one retailer have altruistic preferences, two manufacturers should adopt higher altruistic preference coefficients, and the retailer should adopt a lower altruistic preference coefficient, and the product greenness under the three altruistic preferences is higher than the product greenness when there is no altruistic preference.

show abstract

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Greenness and Pricing Decisions of Cooperative Supply Chains Considering Altruistic Preferences

Huang

Zhang

Ren

et al. 2018

IJERPH

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…At the same time, the DCE results showed that healthcare providers also valued the higher level of healthcare team. Except the professional nature, which determines their instinct to provide better services to residents, altruistic behavior that has been proven in the previous studies may also explain these preference choices ( 29 , 30 ). Moreover, results from previous studies have suggested FDs' role as perfect agent for their patients can be strengthened in the presence of an effective governance and operating environment ( 20 , 31 ).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 84%

Do Residents and Healthcare Providers Differ in Preference for Family Doctor Contract Service? Evidence From a Discrete Choice Experiment

Zhang

Qin

et al. 2022

Front. Public Health

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

ObjectiveFew are known on how and to what extent residents and healthcare providers have different preferences for family doctor contract service (FDCS). This study aimed to elicit and compare the residents' and healthcare providers' preferences for FDCS through a discrete choice experiment (DCE).MethodsResidents and healthcare providers recruited for the DCE were asked to choose repeatedly between two hypothetical service plans, which differed in six attributes: cost, service package, service delivery, type of service, accessibility of medicine, and level of healthcare team. We use mixed logit regression models to determine preferences for potential attributes.ResultsA total of 2,159 residents and 729 healthcare providers completed valid DCE questionnaires. The mixed logit model results suggested that cost, service package, service delivery, type of service, accessibility of medicine, and level of healthcare team all had a significant impact on residents' and healthcare providers' preference. The level of healthcare team was the most important characteristic of FDCS to both residents and healthcare providers, followed by types of service. They have different preferences on the cost and way of service delivery.ConclusionsThis study provides new evidence on how and to what extent residents and healthcare providers have different preferences for FDCS by determining their perception of various service attributes. These findings suggested that the optimal design and improvement of FDCS plans should consider not only residents but also healthcare providers' preferences to maximize contract service uptake.

show abstract

“…Noting that min x∈P U (x, x) ≤ U (x, x), ∀x ∈ P, we have min g∈BR(s) U (g • s(x), x) ≤ U (x, x), ∀x ∈ P, ∀P ∈ P(s). (12) Note that if s • ∈ A S is a one-to-one mapping then every set P in P(s • ) is a singleton set and B R (s • ) = {s −1 • }. Thus, for all one-to-one mappings s…”

Section: Characterization Of the Stackelberg Equilibriummentioning

confidence: 99%

Information Revelation Through Signalling

Deori¹,

Kulkarni²

2022

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper studies a Stackelberg game wherein a sender (leader) attempts to shape the information of a less informed receiver (follower) who in turn takes an action that determines the payoff of both players. The sender chooses signals to maximize its own utility function while the receiver aims to ascertain the value of a source that is privately known to the sender. It is well known that such sender-receiver games admit a vast number of equilibria and not all signals from the sender can be relied on as truthful. Our main contribution is an exact characterization of the minimum number of distinct source symbols that can be correctly recovered by a receiver in any equilibrium of this game; we call this quantity the informativeness of the sender. We show that the informativeness is given by the vertex clique cover number of a certain graph induced by the utility function, whereby it can be computed based on the utility function alone without the need to enumerate all equilibria. We find that informativeness characterizes the existence of well-known classes of separating, pooling and semi-separating equilibria. We also compare informativeness with the amount of information obtained by the receiver when it is the leader and show that the informativeness is always greater than the latter, implying that the receiver is better off being a follower.

show abstract

Reputational concerns with altruistic providers

Cited by 18 publications

References 53 publications

Greenness and Pricing Decisions of Cooperative Supply Chains Considering Altruistic Preferences

Greenness and Pricing Decisions of Cooperative Supply Chains Considering Altruistic Preferences

Do Residents and Healthcare Providers Differ in Preference for Family Doctor Contract Service? Evidence From a Discrete Choice Experiment

Information Revelation Through Signalling

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About