Reputational cues in repeated trust games

Boero, Riccardo; Bravo, Giangiacomo; Castellani, Marco; Squazzoni, Flaminio

doi:10.1016/j.socec.2009.05.004

Cited by 65 publications

(72 citation statements)

References 31 publications

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“…The same situation occurred comparing treatments 3 and C3: both investments and returns C3 were slightly lower than in treatment 3, but the difference was not significant at the 5% level (see Table 2). [4] 4.4 The similarity of the corresponding treatments in Boero et al (2009) and in the current experiment was confirmed by looking at the average of B's as function of the reputation scores assigned by A. In both treatments 1 and C1, the reputation scores obtained by B players clearly depended on their returns and followed a similar logic (see Table 3).…”

Section: 3supporting

confidence: 64%

“…Nevertheless, our experiment shows that, without incentives, a predisposition to fairness tended to guide evaluators' actions. At the same time, A players tended to trust the score expressed by third parties, just as they trusted those that emerged from the dyadic interaction in Boero et al (2009) experiment.…”

Section: 3mentioning

confidence: 95%

“…Regarding the second side of reputation, Boero et al (2009) showed that reputation also matters when any practical consequences of reputational information for players' pay-offs is ruled out (see experiment 2 in Boero et al, 2009). In conclusion, although a large part of the reputation effect is due to strategic investment (e.g.…”

Section: 22mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Pillars of Trust: An Experimental Study on Reputation and Its Effects

Boero

Bravo

Castellani

et al. 2009

Sociological Research Online

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This paper presents the results of laboratory experiments on the relevance of reputation for trust and cooperation in social interaction. We have extended a repeated investment game by adding new treatments where reputation is taken more explicitly into account than before. We then compared treatments where the investor and the trustee rate each other and treatments where the investor and the trustee were rated by a third party. The results showed that: (i) third party reputation positively affects cooperation by encapsulating trust; (ii) certain differences in the reputation mechanism can generate different cooperation outcomes. These results have interesting implications for the recent sociological debate on the normative pillars of markets.

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Section: 3supporting

confidence: 64%

Section: 3mentioning

confidence: 95%

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Pillars of Trust: An Experimental Study on Reputation and Its Effects

Boero

Bravo

Castellani

et al. 2009

Sociological Research Online

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“… Allowing reputation formation increases trust (Berg et al 1995;Boero et al 2009;Charness et al 2011;Dubois et al 2012);  Third party punishment increases trust (Charness et al 2008);  Reduction in social distance increases trust, as shown by the effect of unbinding communication in Bracht and Feltovich (2009);  Fair procedures, such as consultative voting on the preferred outcome, increase trust in Bogliacino, Jiménez and Grimalda (2015).…”

Section: Trustmentioning

confidence: 99%

Microfoundations, behaviour, and evolution: Evidence from experiments

Bogliacino

Codagnone

2021

Structural Change and Economic Dynamics

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The article discusses whether and to what extent experiments can contribute to a research paradigm based on the study of human behaviour in complex evolving environments and on the problem of asymmetric adjustment among different components of economic system along certain trajectories, focusing on the possibility that experimental evidence may represent an external consistency check on this type of heterodox modelling. It considers the evidence on rationality of human agents, and the possibility to identify a microfoundation alternative to homo oeconomicus, discussing the evidence on humans as strong reciprocators, as trusting individuals and as embedded in social norms.

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“…Sometimes unexpected opportunities for repeated exchange with previously cooperative or uncooperative partners arise 2 . Once exchange histories establish, partners with mutually beneficial non-binding agreements often reap gains from iterated trust-based trade with one another (Cochard et al, 2004;Boero et al, 2009;Kaplan et al, 2012). However, investors ceding resources (in anticipation of desired returns) remain subject to various kinds of exploitation by previously trusted partners.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Predictable and Predictive Emotions: Explaining Cheap Signals and Trust Re-Extension

Schniter

Sheremeta

2014

SSRN Journal

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Despite normative predictions from economics and biology, unrelated strangers will often develop the trust necessary to reap gains from one-shot economic exchange opportunities. This appears to be especially true when declared intentions and emotions can be cheaply communicated. Perhaps even more puzzling to economists and biologists is the observation that anonymous and unrelated individuals, known to have breached trust, often make effective use of cheap signals, such as promises and apologies, to encourage trust re-extension. We used a pair of trust games with one-way communication and an emotion survey to investigate the role of emotions in regulating the propensity to message, apologize, re-extend trust, and demonstrate trustworthiness. This design allowed us to observe the endogenous emergence and natural distribution of trust-relevant behaviors, remedial strategies used by promise-breakers, their effects on behavior, and subsequent outcomes. We found that emotions triggered by interaction outcomes are predictable and also predict subsequent apology and trust re-extension. The role of emotions in behavioral regulation helps explain why messages are produced, when they can be trusted, and when trust will be re-extended.Keywords: emotion, cheap signal, promise, apology, trust game, reciprocity, experiment INTRODUCTIONIn this paper, we explore the role of positive emotions (pride, believability, appreciation, contentment, cheerfulness, happiness) and negative emotions (guilt, shame, anger, disgust, aggravation, frustration) in regulating cheap signaling, trust re-extension, and trustworthy behavior in the wake of a veiled trust-based interaction between strangers with no explicit indication of certain expectation for repeated interaction 1 . Interactions with 1 A number of other behavioral economic studies have also used veiled designs where interacting participants are unaware of opportunity for repeated interaction(s) that will later be made available (e.g., see Binmore et al., 1985;Burnham et al., 2000;Ellingsen et al., 2010;Gambetta and Székely, 2014). Ellingsen et al. (2010, p. 96) discuss why the veiled design avoiding deception by commission does not violate the non-deception norm in behavioral economic experiments and why withholding procedural information may serve to limit undesirable experimenter demand. Nevertheless, because there is no clear agreement among economists as to what kinds of deception are taboo (see survey results by Krawczyk, 2013 and discussion by Wilson, 2014), deception by omission remains a potential concern with our design. Veiled designs may create negative externality in that the next time participants return to the laboratory to participate in other studies, they may question whether they should anticipate unannounced tasks or interactions, unless the instructions explicitly exclude such a possibility (see also Davis and Holt, 1993, pp. 23-24;Wilson, 2014). It is unlikely that our design produced these externalities, however, as we followed the procedural norm for conducting...

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Reputational cues in repeated trust games

Cited by 65 publications

References 31 publications

Pillars of Trust: An Experimental Study on Reputation and Its Effects

Pillars of Trust: An Experimental Study on Reputation and Its Effects

Microfoundations, behaviour, and evolution: Evidence from experiments

Predictable and Predictive Emotions: Explaining Cheap Signals and Trust Re-Extension

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