Research joint ventures, product differentiation, and price collusion

Lambertini, Luca; Poddar, Sougata; Sasaki, Dan

doi:10.1016/s0167-7187(00)00082-5

Cited by 49 publications

(41 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…The concavity condition is > 2n= , and it is strictest for = 1 (in which case it reduces to > 2). 30 The SOC, @ qq i < 0, requires that 2n + > 0; the stability condition, q < 0, requires that n + (1 + ) > 0. Therefore, !…”

Section: Equilibrium and Strategic E¤ectsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…39 As when, for example, an RJV stipulates downstream market division for any patents that may result from the venture or when there are collateral agreements that impose cross-licensing of old patents (or a per-unit output royalty for using new patents)-since these circumstances reduce the incentives of …rms to increase their output (Grossman and Shapiro 1986;Brodley 1990). The various channels through which cooperative R&D may facilitate coordination in the product market are analyzed by Martin (1995), van Wegberg (1995), Greenlee and Cassiman (1999), Cabral (2000), Lambertini et al (2002), and Miyagiwa (2009). Rey and Tirole (2013) examine how both independent marketing and joint marketing alliances (e.g., patent pools) can lead to tacit collusion.…”

Section: Alternative Interpretation: Randd Cooperation Extending To Thementioning

confidence: 99%

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Cross-Ownership, R&D Spillovers, and Antitrust Policy

López

Vives

2016

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Cross-ownership, R&D Spillovers, and Antitrust Policy Abstract This paper considers cost-reducing R&D investment with spillovers in a Cournot oligopoly with minority shareholdings. We find that, with high market concentration and sufficiently convex demand, there is no scope for cross-ownership to improve welfare regardless of spillover levels. Otherwise, there is scope for cross-ownership provided that spillovers are sufficiently large. The socially optimal degree of cross-ownership increases with the number of firms, with the elasticity of demand and of the innovation function, and with the extent of spillover effects. In terms of consumer surplus standard, the scope for cross-ownership is greatly reduced even under low market concentration. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor mayJEL-Codes: D430, L130, O320.

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Section: Equilibrium and Strategic E¤ectsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Alternative Interpretation: Randd Cooperation Extending To Thementioning

confidence: 99%

Cross-Ownership, R&D Spillovers, and Antitrust Policy

López

Vives

2016

SSRN Journal

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“…The channels through which cooperation in R&D facilitates product market collusion have been examined in a number of theoretical studies [11][12][13][14][15]. According to Fisher [16, p. 194…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Research and Development Cooperatives and Market Collusion: A Global Dynamic Approach

Hinloopen

Smrkolj

Wagener

2017

J Optim Theory Appl

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We present a continuous-time generalization of the seminal research and development model of d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (Am Econ Rev 78(5): [1133][1134][1135][1136][1137] 1988) to examine the trade-off between the benefits of allowing firms to cooperate in research and the corresponding increased potential for product market collusion. We show the existence of a solution to the optimal investment problem using a combination of results from viscosity theory and the theory of planar dynamical systems. In particular, we show that there is a critical level of marginal cost at which firms are indifferent between doing nothing and starting to develop the technology. We find that colluding firms develop further a wider range of initial technologies, pursue innovations more quickly, and are less likely to abandon a technology. Product market collusion could thus yield higher total surplus.

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“…The channels through which cooperation in R&D facilitates product market collusion have been examined in a number of theoretical studies (Martin, 1995;Greenlee and Cassiman, 1999;Cabral, 2000;Lambertini et al, 2002;Miyagiwa, 2009). According to Fisher (1990, p. 194…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

R&D Cooperatives and Market Collusion: A Global Dynamic Approach

2017

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. (American Economic Review, 1988) to examine the trade-off between the benefits of allowing firms to cooperate in R&D and the corresponding increased potential for product market collusion. We consider all trajectories that are candidates for an optimal solution as well as initial marginal cost levels that exceed the choke price. Firms that collude develop further a wider range of initial technologies, pursue innovations more quickly, and are less likely to abandon a technology. Product market collusion could thus yield higher total surplus. Terms of use: Documents in

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Research joint ventures, product differentiation, and price collusion

Abstract: The Creative Commons license below applies only to this version of the article.

Cited by 49 publications

References 26 publications

Cross-Ownership, R&D Spillovers, and Antitrust Policy

Cross-Ownership, R&D Spillovers, and Antitrust Policy

Research and Development Cooperatives and Market Collusion: A Global Dynamic Approach

R&D Cooperatives and Market Collusion: A Global Dynamic Approach

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