Research on Civil Aircraft Spare Parts Pooling Evolutionary Game based on Supervision and Incentive Mechanism

Abstract

In order to promote the cooperation of spare parts pooling alliance among airlines, an evolutionary game model of willingness to cooperate based on third-party supervision and incentive mechanism is established in this paper. The evolutionary stable conditions of the alliance members under different decision-making behaviors are analyzed by simulation, and the influence of relevant parameters on evolutionary results are determined. The results indicate that with certain constraints satisfied, the strategy choices of game parties can be brought to a cooperative state by adopting third-party supervision and incentive method. When the level of willingness to cooperate in a low state, the larger airline more tends to adopt non-cooperative strategy relative to the other. Meanwhile, increasing the level of supervision and penalty intensity can avoid free-rider behavior of airlines. Increasing the level of incentive can motivate airlines to adopt positive game strategies effectively. Expanding the size of spare parts pooling alliance can help to increase the incremental profit and shorten the time for evolving to the cooperation state.