Research on Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Competing Retailers under Government Reward-Penalty Mechanism and Asymmetric Information

Abstract

In manufacturer-led closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with two competing retailers, the retailer-1 recycles WEEE whose fixed recycling cost is asymmetric information. Using dynamics game theory and principal-agent theory, three dynamic game models are built including (1) benchmark model without reward-penalty mechanism (RPM); (2) decentralized model with carbon emission RPM; (3) decentralized model with carbon emission RPM and recovery rate RPM. This paper discusses the influence of RPM and retailers competition on the CLSC and members benefits. The results show that (1) the carbon emission RPM increases retail price, but decreases the WEEE recycling motivation usually. On the contrary, the recovery rate RPM guides WEEE recycling and lowers the retail price effectively. (2) In any case, the retailer-1’s profit is higher than that of the retailer-2; apparently it suggests that the retailer recycling WEEE gains competitive advantages. Furthermore, both the recovery rate RPM and retailers competition are beneficial to improve the competitive advantage. The relationship between two retailers’ retail price is affected by many complicated factors. (3) The WEEE buyback price and WEEE recovery rate with high fixed recycling cost (H-type) are always higher than that of low fixed recycling cost (L-type), respectively, which means that the H-type fixed recycling cost has scale advantages; the greater the reward-penalty intensity and the fiercer the competition, the more obvious the scale advantages under certain condition. (4) The retailers’ competition can not only guide WEEE recycling but also improve retailers’ profits. Meanwhile, the impact of competition on the manufacturer is related to RPM, but the fierce competition decreases the manufacturer’s profit.

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