Research on multiple co-governance of agricultural non-point source pollution in China on the perspective of ENGOs and public participation

Tang, Jing; Li, Shilong

doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0280360

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 42 publications

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“…Simultaneously, government departments limit the scope of NGOs’ authority to prevent "power overreach." Therefore, the regulatory cost [ 46 ] is rewritten as . In this equation, the NGO participation level is denoted as p , and power space is represented by e .…”

Section: Problem Description and Model Assumptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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An evolutionary game-theoretic analysis of the "multi-agent co-governance" system of unfair competition on internet platforms

Xu,

Zheng

2024

PLoS ONE

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The increasingly prominent issue of unfair competition on Internet platforms (IPUC) severely restricts the healthy and sustainable development of the platform economy. Based on the IPUC "multi-agent co-governance" scenario, this paper introduces stochastic disturbances and continuous strategy set to improve the classical binary deterministic evolutionary game system. The results show that after considering stochastic disturbances, the positive state corresponding to the equilibrium point (1,1) is no longer stable, and the required parameter conditions are more stringent. The IPUC "multi-agent co-governance" system under stochastic disturbances exhibits specific vulnerability. In the continuous strategy set evolutionary game system, government departments and Internet platforms can flexibly make optimal decisions based on maximizing expected returns, and strategy selection has better elasticity. Regardless of the evolutionary game scenario, maintaining the participation level of NGOs and the public above a certain threshold while increasing the penalty intensity is conducive to the evolution of the game system toward the positive state. The analysis process and conclusions provide insights and guidance for the governments to design the IPUC regulatory system and frameworks.

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Section: Problem Description and Model Assumptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Simultaneously, government departments limit the scope of NGOs' authority to prevent "power overreach." Therefore, the regulatory cost [46] is rewritten as…”

Section: Plos Onementioning

confidence: 99%

An evolutionary game-theoretic analysis of the "multi-agent co-governance" system of unfair competition on internet platforms

Xu,

Zheng

2024

PLoS ONE

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Governing the misconduct of OTA platforms: A tripartite evolutionary game analysis considering the collaborative supervision of airlines and consumers

Li,

Tai,

Zhou

et al. 2024

PLoS ONE

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Online travel agency (OTA) platforms frequently engage in unfair behaviors that infringe on the legitimate rights and interests of consumers and airlines in the ticket sale market. Effective governance of the OTA platforms’ misconduct has become an urgent topic. In order to address the governance dilemma of OTA platforms’ misconduct, a tripartite evolutionary game model considering the collaborative supervision between airlines and consumers is constructed. This study analyzes the evolutionary path and stable strategy of the three participants, airlines, platforms and consumers by numerical simulation. The results show that some actions, such as airlines’ strict control of ticket sales resources and high fines on the platform, reducing the cost of customers’ rights protection, and effectively guiding online public opinion, can benefit airlines and consumers and enhance their willingness to cooperate in supervision. Legitimate consumer rights protection not only brings negative public opinion and image loss to airlines, but also to platforms, which can force airlines to impose stricter constraints on platforms and force platforms to strengthen self-restraint. Therefore, a market mechanism instead of government regulatory that can effectively suppress platforms misconduct should be established to promote platforms self-regulation through a collaborative effort between airlines and consumers. Some special measures that guide the interests of three participators are also provided.

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A review of typical water pollution control and cost-benefit analysis in China

Feng,

Wang,

Huang

et al. 2024

Front. Environ. Sci.

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This study summarized and evaluated the cost-benefit analysis methods for typical water environment pollution control measures in China. We conducted a comprehensive comparison of these measures, whose advantages and disadvantages were examined, so the application models and characteristics can be delved into. Through integrating methods and analyzing application cases, we refined a combination of measures with high efficiency and low cost in controlling China’s water environment. In our analysis of cost-benefit, we emphasized the importance of implementing scientifically designed control measures and employing rigorous methods to addressing water environment pollution. In order to achieve rapid response and efficient treatment of China’s environmental problems, we advocated for establishing a cross regional pollution control mechanism. That is, the collaborative platform and scientific suggestions for all participants in this field should be provided, through interdisciplinary integration, development of domestic models, and expansion of databases.

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Research on multiple co-governance of agricultural non-point source pollution in China on the perspective of ENGOs and public participation

Cited by 3 publications

References 42 publications

An evolutionary game-theoretic analysis of the "multi-agent co-governance" system of unfair competition on internet platforms

An evolutionary game-theoretic analysis of the "multi-agent co-governance" system of unfair competition on internet platforms

Governing the misconduct of OTA platforms: A tripartite evolutionary game analysis considering the collaborative supervision of airlines and consumers

A review of typical water pollution control and cost-benefit analysis in China

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