2017
DOI: 10.1002/cpe.4218
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Research on network programming language and policy conflicts for SDN

Abstract: Summary Through network programmability, software defined network can simplify network control and management. Since the current software defined network southbound interface level is low and programming situation is complex, it requires a high‐level abstract programming language to simplify programming. First, this paper improves the NetCore programming language to generate NetCore‐M language, so that it can support deployment of multipolicies combination including packet drop action. This paper describes in … Show more

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Cited by 11 publications
(5 citation statements)
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“…All the end-user applications are in this layer, which has their network requirements and is passed to the control layer through the northbound interface. Some of the northbound interfaces are REST API [26], pyretic [27], Frenetic [28], Procera [29], etc.…”
Section: ) Application Layermentioning
confidence: 99%
“…All the end-user applications are in this layer, which has their network requirements and is passed to the control layer through the northbound interface. Some of the northbound interfaces are REST API [26], pyretic [27], Frenetic [28], Procera [29], etc.…”
Section: ) Application Layermentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Since multiple customized or third-party-provided applications are running in the control plane, 8 policies generated by applications may compete, conflict, or override with each other. The prior methods of policies conflict resolution [9][10][11][12] only considered running state conflicts, and only detected when a security vulnerability occurs after the error policy is installed. In this way, conflict prevention and policies management cannot be achieved.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…2) Fraud traffic insertion: Malicious or buggy applications could generate erroneous harmful flow rules and routing policies, but compromised applications are hard to be detected. 3) Conflicts between applications: each application generates lots of flow rules, but it's hard to guarantee that there are no conflicts between these rules [40]. Therefore, how to deal with the conflicts among applications is another challenge of SDN security.…”
Section: Motivationmentioning
confidence: 99%