Research on the Equilibrium of a Revenue Sharing Contract in a Transfer-Operation-Transfer Project Based on the Theory of Share Tenancy

Abstract

To solve the transfer-operate-transfer (TOT) project contract model selection, contract structure optimization and the largest revenue of government and private partners, a revenue-sharing contract (RSC) structure equilibrium model of a TOT project is constructed based on the theory of share tenancy. According to the key parameters of RSC structure, the algebraic model is constructed by using the Lagrange multiplier method, and the geometric model is built by adopting the dynamic equilibrium method. The equilibrium conditions of the two models are obtained under the constraints of the maximization of income of both parties, and the equilibrium conditions of two models are verified as completely consistent. The result shows that 1) The RSC structure of the TOT project can achieve Pareto optimality and maximize revenue for both parties; 2) As the proportion of participants' investment or risk sharing increases, their revenue-sharing ratio (RSR) will increase, and vice versa; 3) Regardless of transaction costs, the three contract models are equivalent; considering the transaction costs, the revenue share of the government in the RSC is greater than that in the equilibrium state. 4) Changing the assumptions, the equilibrium model can still provide ideas for revenue sharing contract structure and efficiency optimization.

Fuzzy Synthetic Evaluation of the Critical Success Factors for the Sustainability of Public Private Partnership Projects in China

“…When revenue is distributed, the two parties compete for interests and strive to minimize their own opportunity costs. Under market competition, public and private sector achieve a winwin situation through cooperation and competition [118]. Nonetheless, unreasonable revenue distribution can affect a project's normal operation.…”