Resolving Controversy in the European Union

Thomson, Robert

doi:10.1017/cbo9781139005357

Cited by 199 publications

(138 citation statements)

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“…When the legislative procedure is consultation with qualified majority voting the Presidency effect is of similar magnitude to that under the codecision procedure (Thomson 2011). …”

Section: Relais Actor Hypothesismentioning

confidence: 96%

“…But since a number of studies using different methodologies and data seem to point in the same direction (Reh et al 2010;Thomson 2008;2011;Warntjen 2008), and taking into account the initial prediction by Farrell and Héritier (2004) that the Council would be less vulnerable to power distortions than the EP, it seems unlikely that co-decision has led to any significant shifts in power to the advantage of the Presidency.…”

Section: Figure 2 About Herementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Both the uncertainty about minister's preferences and the probability that an incorrect decision by the bureaucrat will be drawn to the minister's attention is likely to be influenced by the empowerment of the EP. The EP is known to introduce additional policy dimensions to the negotiation space (Rittberger 2000;Tsebelis 1996) and frequently occupies rather extreme positions (Kaeding and Selck 2005;Thomson 2011;Thomson et al 2004). In addition, the need for Council actors to strategically anticipate possible moves of the Parliament at later stages in the process makes the co-decision procedure considerably more complex than the consultation procedure.…”

Section: Politicization Hypothesismentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Thomson (2011), however, uses an extended data set which includes proposals up until 2007 to analyse bargaining success. His analysis shows that member states that are positioned closer to the Presidency have a higher chance of succeeding, although decreasingly so after enlargement.…”

Section: Relais Actor Hypothesismentioning

confidence: 99%

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The effect of codecision on Council decision-making: informalization, politicization and power

Häge¹,

Naurin²

2013

Journal of European Public Policy

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Little is known about the effects of the inter-institutional linkages created through the establishment of the co-decision procedure on decision-making in the Council of the European Union. After a review of the existing literature and theories on this topic, we examine to what extent the co-decision procedure leads to more involvement of ministers in Council decision-making and to a more powerful position of the Presidency in the internal negotiation process of the Council. The results show that the initially positive effect of codecision on the politicization of Council decision-making has been offset in recent years by a growing lack of transparency in inter-institutional proceedings caused by the use of informal trialogue negotiations to conclude the procedure early. However, our study also suggests that the country holding the Presidency does not occupy a more privileged position in the Council's internal cooperation network as a result of these developments. Thus, with respect to the Council, informal inter-institutional negotiation practices seem to decrease the transparency of the decision-making process and the accountability of the actors involved, but they may not have as adverse effects on who gets what in terms of policy as previously thought.

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“…When the legislative procedure is consultation with qualified majority voting the Presidency effect is of similar magnitude to that under the codecision procedure (Thomson 2011). …”

Section: Relais Actor Hypothesismentioning

confidence: 96%

Section: Figure 2 About Herementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Politicization Hypothesismentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Relais Actor Hypothesismentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

The effect of codecision on Council decision-making: informalization, politicization and power

Häge¹,

Naurin²

2013

Journal of European Public Policy

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“…Steunenberg (1994), Tsebelis (1994), Crombez (1996Crombez ( , 1997Crombez ( , 2001), Moser (1997) and Tsebelis and Garrett (2000), amongst others, have presented spatial models of the EU legislative process. Thomson et al (2006) and Thomson (2011) have tested these and other theories. Spatial models have also been used to study other aspects of EU politics, albeit less often.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Legislative Activity and Gridlock in the European Union

Crombez

Hix

2012

SSRN Journal

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*We develop a game-theoretical model of European Union (EU) policy making which suggests that the amount of legislative activity depends on the size of the gridlock interval, consistent with Krehbiel's (1998) study of US politics. This interval depends on two factors: (1) the preference configuration of the political actors; and (2) the legislative procedures in a particular period.Actors' preferences and the procedures are not expected to have any effect beyond their impact on the gridlock interval. We predict smaller gridlock intervals, and thus more legislative activity, when the pivotal member states and the European Parliament and/or EU Commission are closer to each other. We also predict smaller gridlock intervals under the codecision than the consultation procedure and under qualified-majority voting in the Council than under unanimity.We find empirical support for these propositions in an empirical analysis of EU legislative activity between 1979 and 2009.

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European environmental policy at 50: Five decades of escaping decision traps?

Deters

2019

Env Pol Gov

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Rather than being constrained by the least ambitious governments, the European Union (EU) has until recently set the pace of national environmental policy. The contribution examines why the EU was often able to set the pace despite the institutionalist expectation that national diversity and quasi-unanimity should produce joint-decision traps. It also explains why this is no longer the case. Adopting a long-term, diachronic perspective, I argue that the EU's unexpected dynamism and its recent decline are related to distinct institutional exits from the joint-decision trap that have opened and closed in different periods. During the emergence of the policy area, diversity was manageable through bargaining, and joint gains were abundant.Between the late 1980s and the Eastern enlargement, as environmental policy was increasingly adopted under the community method, supranational intervention became an additional exit mechanism, with an activist European Parliament and strong agenda setting by the Commission. Since mid-2000, the green dynamism is in decline, as supranational interventions wane and bargaining solutions become insufficient to cope with increased diversity after enlargement, exacerbated by the economic crisis. However, nonpolitical lawmaking in the regulatory mode is emerging as a novel exit from the joint-decision trap.

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Resolving Controversy in the European Union

Cited by 199 publications

References 0 publications

The effect of codecision on Council decision-making: informalization, politicization and power

The effect of codecision on Council decision-making: informalization, politicization and power

Legislative Activity and Gridlock in the European Union

European environmental policy at 50: Five decades of escaping decision traps?

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