Resource Delegation and Rewards to Stimulate Forwarding in Multihop Cellular Networks

Lindström, Magnus; Lungaro, Pietro

doi:10.1109/vetecs.2005.1543715

Cited by 12 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…In which zeros in v (1,2,3) and v (12,3) indicate that when no nodes relay for M S 3 , it can't reach BS by itself and gets no resources, so M S 1 and M S 2 have all the subchannels between them.…”

Section: Restricted Coalitions In Partition Function Formmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…By way of exception, M. Lindstrom et al proposed to stimulate forwarding by pricing with the addition of bandwidth delegation in [3]; Wei Hung-Yu et al in [9] proposed a scheduling incentive algorithm. In addition to a central operator that maintains a billing account for each node, these economic rewarding methods generally require particular records to be maintained and manipulated in each node, thus involve certain security and credit problem.…”

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confidence: 99%

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A Relaying Incentive Scheme for Multihop Cellular Networks Based on Coalition Game with Externalities

Yang

et al. 2009

Wireless Pers Commun

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Cooperative multihop communication can greatly increase network throughput, yet packet forwarding may involve opportunity and energy cost for relays. Thus one of the primary problems in the implementation of multihop transmission is how to foster cooperation among selfish nodes. Existing researches mainly adopt price and monetary stimulating. We propose instead a self-enforcing incentive scheme free of monetary remunerating for asymmetric cellar network. The incentive comprises double compensation, namely, global stimulating policy among coalitions (Inter-BEA) and local allocating rule within each coalition (Intra-BEA). We validate effectiveness of the proposed BEA scheme based on coalition game theory. Theoretical analysis and numerical simulation show that our techniques can provide enough motivation for nodes to relay for own profits, and thus enlarge system coverage.

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Section: Restricted Coalitions In Partition Function Formmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

A Relaying Incentive Scheme for Multihop Cellular Networks Based on Coalition Game with Externalities

Yang

et al. 2009

Wireless Pers Commun

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“…In [12] static pricing policies for multipleservice networks were proposed to offer the needed incentives for each node to choose the service that best matched its needs, thereby discouraging over-allocation of resources and improving social welfare. In [13] an incentive mechanism to stimulate forwarding in multihop cellular networks was proposed, which was composed of resource delegation to reduce the cost associated with forwarding and pricing-based rewards to create further forwarding incentive. The authors in [14] proposed a pricing game that stimulated cooperation via reimbursements to the relay assuming nodes were selfish and aimed to maximize their own utilities.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Distributed Relay Selection and Power Control for Multiuser Cooperative Communication Networks Using Buyer/Seller Game

Wang

Han

Liu

2007

IEEE INFOCOM 2007 - 26th IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications

152

101

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Abstract-The performances in cooperative communications depend on careful resource allocation such as relay selection and power control, but traditional centralized resource allocation needs considerable overhead and signaling to exchange the information for channel estimations. In this paper, we propose a distributed buyer/seller game theoretic framework over multiuser cooperative communication networks to stimulate cooperation and improve the system performance. By employing a two-level game to jointly consider the benefits of source nodes as buyers and relay nodes as sellers, the proposed approach not only helps the source smartly find the relays at relatively better locations and buy optimal amount of power from them, but also helps the competing relays maximize their own utilities by asking the reasonable prices. The game is proved to converge to a unique optimal equilibrium. From the simulation results, the relays in good locations can play more important roles in increasing source node's utility, so the source would like to buy more power from these preferred relays. On the other hand, the relays have to set the proper prices to attract the source's buying because of competition from other relays and selections from the source. Moreover, the distributed game resource allocation can achieve comparable performance compared with the centralized one.

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“…Proper incentive mechanisms are therefore required to facilitate cooperation. These incentive mechanisms can be roughly classified as reputation based mechanisms [1]- [5], credit based mechanisms [6]- [9], network assisted pricing [10] [11] and mechanisms based on forwarding games [12]- [15]. These prior efforts often mimic the operation of a complex economy, and in doing so they illustrate the difficulties inherent in this approach.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bandwidth exchange as an incentive for relaying

Zhang

Ileri

Mandayam

2008

2008 42nd Annual Conference on Information Sciences and Systems

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Abstract-Relay cooperation has been recognized as an important mechanism to enhance connectivity and throughput in multi-hop wireless networks, especially under varying channel conditions. One major problem of relay cooperation is that relaying always incurs energy and possibly delay costs. To a rational and selfish node these costs are worth incurring only if it receives at least comparable returns in the long term. In light of this, we propose a new incentive mechanism called bandwidth exchange (BE) where a node can delegate a portion of its bandwidth to another node in exchange for relay cooperation. In this paper we specifically study BE in the simple form of exchanging orthogonal frequency bands to provide incentives for relaying in a wireless network. Other forms of exchanging bandwidth such as delegation of time-slots or using spreading codes of different lengths are also possible. Using a Nash Bargaining framework, we explore the advantage of BE in both static and fading channels.

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Resource Delegation and Rewards to Stimulate Forwarding in Multihop Cellular Networks

Cited by 12 publications

References 6 publications

A Relaying Incentive Scheme for Multihop Cellular Networks Based on Coalition Game with Externalities

A Relaying Incentive Scheme for Multihop Cellular Networks Based on Coalition Game with Externalities

Distributed Relay Selection and Power Control for Multiuser Cooperative Communication Networks Using Buyer/Seller Game

Bandwidth exchange as an incentive for relaying

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