Resource mobilization in security partnerships: Explaining cooperation and coercion in the EU’s partnership with the African Union

Abstract

Security partnerships between unequal partners walk a fine line between mutually beneficial cooperation and coercion. This article theorizes resource provision in security partnerships in which a funder substantively supports a recipient organization. Specifically, I develop an argument concerning the effect of principal–agent interactions in security partnerships on the recipient’s agency through mechanisms of agenda-setting and capacity-building. The European Union’s (EU) peace and security partnership with the African Union (AU) illustrates the contentious politics of resource mobilization in security partnerships, and how these politics affect the secretariat of the recipient organization. The article arrives at the rather optimistic conclusion that the EU is a generous partner with an explicit goal of cooperative engagement. Furthermore, opportunities for coercion are minimized by the EU’s internal bureaucratic obstacles, the AU’s strategic sequencing of the resource mobilization process, and the overarching post-coloniality of the partnership. However, occasional episodes of coercive EU behaviour have led to considerable tensions in the partnership. These findings add important contrast to postcolonial critiques of AU funding: the AU Commission exercises considerable organizational agency, which relegates the EU – despite being a large payer – to the role of a small player, particularly when it comes to directly influencing the AU.

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