Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Router Implementation Report

Waehlisch, Matthias; Gredler, Hannes; Patel, Keyur; Bush, Randy; Austein, Rob

doi:10.17487/rfc7128

Cited by 3 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 1 publication

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“…Considering implementation variations. Active RPKI experiments require a careful check of router implementations [3]. For a router to perform ROV when an existing route changes from valid to invalid (due to an RPKI change), the BGP implementation must (i) receive the new ROA payload and (ii) recalculate the best path for this existing entry.…”

Section: Roadmap 51 Operational Concernsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Towards a Rigorous Methodology for Measuring Adoption of RPKI Route Validation and Filtering

Reuter

Bush

Cunha³

et al. 2018

Proceedings of the Applied Networking Research Workshop

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A proposal to improve routing security-Route Origin Authorization (ROA)-has been standardized. A ROA specifies which network is allowed to announce a set of Internet destinations. While some networks now specify ROAs, little is known about whether other networks check routes they receive against these ROAs, a process known as Route Origin Validation (ROV). Which networks blindly accept invalid routes? Which reject them outright? Which de-preference them if alternatives exist?Recent analysis attempts to use uncontrolled experiments to characterize ROV adoption by comparing valid routes and invalid routes [5]. However, we argue that gaining a solid understanding of ROV adoption is impossible using currently available data sets and techniques. Instead, we devise a verifiable methodology of controlled experiments for measuring ROV. Our measurements suggest that, although some ISPs are not observed using invalid routes in uncontrolled experiments, they are actually using different routes for (non-security) traffic engineering purposes, without performing ROV. We conclude with presenting three AS that do implement ROV as confirmed by the operators.

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Section: Roadmap 51 Operational Concernsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Towards a Rigorous Methodology for Measuring Adoption of RPKI Route Validation and Filtering

Reuter

Bush

Cunha³

et al. 2018

Proceedings of the Applied Networking Research Workshop

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Simulation Study of BGP Origin Validation Effect against Mis-Origination with Internet Topology

Masahito¹,

Okada

Kanaoka

2017

2017 12th Asia Joint Conference on Information Security (AsiaJCIS)

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Towards a Rigorous Methodology for Measuring Adoption of RPKI Route Validation and Filtering

Reuter

Bush

Cunha³

et al. 2018

SIGCOMM Comput. Commun. Rev.

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A proposal to improve routing security---Route Origin Authorization (ROA)---has been standardized. A ROA specifies which network is allowed to announce a set of Internet destinations. While some networks now specify ROAs, little is known about whether other networks check routes they receive against these ROAs, a process known as Route Origin Validation (ROV). Which networks blindly accept invalid routes? Which reject them outright? Which de-preference them if alternatives exist? Recent analysis attempts to use uncontrolled experiments to characterize ROV adoption by comparing valid routes and invalid routes. However, we argue that gaining a solid understanding of ROV adoption is impossible using currently available data sets and techniques. Instead, we devise a verifiable methodology of controlled experiments for measuring ROV. Our measurements suggest that, although some ISPs are not observed using invalid routes in uncontrolled experiments, they are actually using different routes for (non-security) traffic engineering purposes, without performing ROV. We conclude with presenting three AS that do implement ROV as confirmed by the operators.

show abstract

Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Router Implementation Report

Cited by 3 publications

References 1 publication

Towards a Rigorous Methodology for Measuring Adoption of RPKI Route Validation and Filtering

Towards a Rigorous Methodology for Measuring Adoption of RPKI Route Validation and Filtering

Simulation Study of BGP Origin Validation Effect against Mis-Origination with Internet Topology

Towards a Rigorous Methodology for Measuring Adoption of RPKI Route Validation and Filtering

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