Responding to religious patients: why physicians have no business doing theology

Abstract

A survey of the recent literature suggests that physicians should engage religious patients on religious grounds when the patient cites religious considerations for a medical decision. We offer two arguments that physicians ought to avoid engaging patients in this manner. The first is the Public Reason Argument. We explain why physicians are relevantly akin to public officials. This suggests that it is not the physician’s proper role to engage in religious deliberation. This is because the public character of a physician’s role binds him/her to public reason, which precludes the use of religious considerations. The second argument is the Fiduciary Argument. We show that the patient-physician relationship is a fiduciary relationship, which suggests that the patient has the clinical expectation that physicians limit themselves to medical considerations. Since engaging in religious deliberations lies outside this set of considerations, such engagement undermines trust and therefore damages the patient-physician relationship.

Responding (appropriately) to religious patients: a response to Greenblum and Hubbard’s ‘Public Reason’ argument

“…Greenblum and Hubbard reject the 'dominant view' that, 'physicians should engage with patients on the patient's or physician's own substantive religious grounds if the patient cites religious considerations during the process of deliberation'. 1…”

“…Public reasons are 'non-sectarian reasons' or 'considerations that any reasonable person could recognise as counting in favour of something', regardless of differences in 'ethical outlooks'. 1 A public reason for reducing carbon emissions, for example, is that 'clean air is necessary for the public's health'. 1 Lastly, public reasons are said to be 'grounded in brute normative intuitions or shared social values'.…”

“…1 A public reason for reducing carbon emissions, for example, is that 'clean air is necessary for the public's health'. 1 Lastly, public reasons are said to be 'grounded in brute normative intuitions or shared social values'. 1 Whether or not there are public reasons is controversial (not to mention claims that these reasons are grounded in 'brute intuitions or shared social values' and are accessible to any 'reasonable' person).…”

“…1 Lastly, public reasons are said to be 'grounded in brute normative intuitions or shared social values'. 1 Whether or not there are public reasons is controversial (not to mention claims that these reasons are grounded in 'brute intuitions or shared social values' and are accessible to any 'reasonable' person). iv I will ignore those concerns, however.…”

“…Greenblum and Hubbard simply advocate a 'division of labour' between experts. 1 iii For the sake of space, I cannot respond to the Fiduciary Argument here.…”