Response to Wilkinson: A Neuro‐Informed Humanistic Perspective

Abstract

The surge in neuroscience‐integrated counseling practice represents threats to humanistic counseling principles and practices as well as opportunities to engage humanism in potentially complementary ways. This article challenges Wilkinson's (2018) view of neuroscience threats to humanism and offers an alternative that expands the opportunities for thoughtful practice.

A Refined and Further Defined Argument on the Limits of Neuroscience in Counseling: Response to Field, Luke, and Beeson and Miller

“…Neither Beeson and Miller () nor Field () addresses the support–inform distinction, while Luke () dismisses it out of hand in a manner that actively distracts from my argument. The tone of that response surely reflects the importance of clarifying the support–inform distinction.…”

“…Beeson and Miller () frame neurocounseling as humanistic by referencing self‐awareness, immediacy, and asking clients about their week. Luke () frames neurocounseling as humanistic by saying it is relational. Field () claims that an emphasis on physiological responses means neurocounseling draws on humanist traditions.…”

“…Such naive misconceptions of humanistic practice degrade its rich conceptual and philosophical foundations. The phenomenal grounds of humanism are in a precarious position as it is (Hansen, ; Lemberger, ); humanistic counseling may indeed be rendered a “counseling culture that no longer exists” (Luke, , p. 91). Misnomers about humanistic practice diminish its credibility and contribute to the errant yet widespread view of humanism as a mere emphasis on forging therapeutic alliances guided by empathy or authenticity.…”

“…The hard problem remains unresolved because the material properties of phenomenal consciousness have not yet been identified or explained by neuroscience. The question as to why we have a first‐person experience at all is indeed a philosophical question within a far broader debate on the mind–body problem, but one that is not so easily dismissed as “contrived” (Luke, , p. 88). It is also not a matter of divergent epistemological conceptions of truth, as Luke suggests.…”

“…It was disappointing to see Luke () suggest I am “against incorporating neuroscience into counseling” (p. 90) without ever mentioning the QHN model (Wilkinson, ). Although my call for humanists to “stalwartly defend” (p. 72) the primacy of phenomenal consciousness was admittedly dramatic, I did not intend, as Luke suggests, to imply that empirical evidence is unimportant.…”