Responsibility and Control

Fischer, John Martin; Ravizza, Mark

doi:10.1017/cbo9780511814594

Cited by 1,557 publications

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“…Nor can I see the relevance of whether Al's "mechanism" for assessing reasons and their weights is a generally reliable one (Fisher & Ravizza, 1998). What seems crucial for moral responsibility is not whether Al would generally think of R but why Al did not do so on the occasion in question.…”

Section: The Analysismentioning

confidence: 96%

The Most Persuasive Frankfurt Example, and What It Shows: Or Why Determinism Is Not the Greatest Threat to Moral Responsibility

Alexander¹

2014

OJPP

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In this paper I argue that even if the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) is satisfied, moral responsibility is more seriously threatened if the Principle of Alternative Possible Reasons (PAPR) is not satisfied. Nor, I argue, is it clear how it could be satisfied. Finally, I suggest that not only moral responsibility, but also normativity itself, is threatened by the failure to satisfy PAPR.

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Section: The Analysismentioning

confidence: 96%

The Most Persuasive Frankfurt Example, and What It Shows: Or Why Determinism Is Not the Greatest Threat to Moral Responsibility

Alexander¹

2014

OJPP

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“…Someone "exhibits guidance control of an action insofar as the mechanism that actually issues in the action is his own, reasons-responsive mechanism." 58 Guidance control requires that the actual mechanism be such that it would respond differently in the presence of different reasons. Fischer & Ravizza state that moral responsibility ought to be characterized not merely as a responsiveness to reasons, but rather as a responsiveness to a range of reasons that include moral reasons.…”

Section: Responsibility and Habitual Behaviourmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Fischer & Ravizza state that moral responsibility ought to be characterized not merely as a responsiveness to reasons, but rather as a responsiveness to a range of reasons that include moral reasons. 60 Young children act often on processes of thought that are reasons responsive, insofar as their ability to reason practically would have led them to do otherwise in response to some other sufficient reason to do otherwise (e.g., a threat of punishment). Still, we usually do not hold children morally accountable because they lack the ability to grasp and respond to specifically moral reasons.…”

Section: Responsibility and Habitual Behaviourmentioning

confidence: 99%

Moral Animals and Moral Responsibility

Musschenga¹

2015

Les ateliers de l'éthique

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Résumé de l'articleLa question centrale dans cet article est celle de savoir si les animaux sont moralement responsables de ce qu'ils font. Répondre à cette question nécessite une argumentation minutieuse et progressive. Dans les sections 1 et 2, j'explique ce qu'est la moralité, et qu'être doté de moralité signifie de se conformer à des règles ou à des normes morales. Dans les sections 3 et 4, je pose que certains animaux ne se contentent pas de montrer des régularités dans leur comportement social, mais qu'ils suivent aussi véritablement des normes sociales. Toutefois, les normes qu'ils suivent sont-elles morales? Dans la section 5, je prétends, en me référant aux travaux de Shaun Nichols, que les compétences ou capacités morales de base sont déjà présentes chez les primates non humains. Respecter des règles ou des normes morales est bien plus que d'agir conformément à ces normes; cela requiert d'être motivé par des règles morales. Dans la section 6, me référant à Mark Rowlands, j'explique que d'être capable de motivation morale ne nécessite pas d'être un agent moral; le fait d'être un sujet moral suffit. Contrairement aux agents moraux, les sujets moraux ne sont pas responsables de leur comportement. Affirmant qu'il y a de grandes similitudes entre le comportement moral d'un animal et le comportement inconscient, automatique et habituel d'un humain, je me penche, dans la section 7, sur la question de savoir si les humains sont responsables de leur comportement moral habituel, et si tel est le cas, sur quelle base on peut alors nier le fait que les animaux sont eux aussi responsables de leur comportement. La réponse à cette question est que les humains sont responsables de leur comportement habituel s'ils disposent d'une capacité d'intervention réfléchie, délibérée. Bien que les animaux soient capables d'intervenir dans leurs comportements habituels, ils ne peuvent le faire de manière réfléchie, délibérée. ABSTRACT:The central question of this article is, Are animals morally responsible for what they do? Answering this question requires a careful, step-by-step argument. In sections 1 and 2, I explain what morality is, and that having a morality means following moral rules or norms. In sections 3 and 4, I argue that some animals show not just regularities in their social behaviour, but can be rightly said to follow social norms. But are the norms they follow also moral norms? In section 5, I contend, referring to the work of Shaun Nichols, that the basic moral competences or capacities are already present in nonhuman primates. Following moral rules or norms is more than just acting in accordance to these norms; it requires being motivated by moral rules. I explain, in section 6, referring to Mark Rowlands, that being capable of moral motivation does not require agency; being a moral subject is sufficient. Contrary to moral agents, moral subjects are not responsible for their behaviour. Stating that there are important similarities between animal moral behaviour and human, unconscious, automatic, habitual behav...

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“…We do not excuse for failures to exercise these capacities properly. Provided they had the relevant cognitive and volitional capacities, we do not excuse the weak--willed or the willful wrongdoer for failing to 10 In framing our approach to the internal dimension of responsibility this way, we draw on previous work in the compatibilist tradition that emphasizes normative competence (Wolf 1990, Wallace 1994) and reasons--responsiveness (Wolf 1990, Wallace 1994, Fischer and Ravizza 1998, and Nelkin 2011 and distinguishes cognitive and volitional dimensions of reasons--responsiveness (Wallace 1994, Fischer andRavizza 1998). recognize or respond appropriately to reasons.…”

Section: Normative Competencementioning

confidence: 99%

Fairness and the Architecture of Responsibility1

Brink¹,

Nelkin²

2013

Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 1

121

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In this essay, we explore a conception of the nature and structure of responsibility that draws on ideas about moral and criminal responsibility. Though the two sorts of responsibility are not the same, the criminal law reflects central assumptions about moral responsibility, and the two concepts of responsibility have very similar structure. Our conception of responsibility draws on work of philosophers in the compatibilist tradition who focus on the choices of agents who are reasons--responsive and work in criminal jurisprudence that understands responsibility in terms of the choices of agents who have capacities for practical reason and whose situation affords them the fair opportunity to avoid wrongdoing. 2 We treat these two perspectives as potentially complementary and argue that each can learn things from the other. Specifically, we think that criminal jurisprudence needs a more systematic conception of the capacities for normative competence and that ideas from the reasons--responsive literature on moral responsibility, some familiar and some novel, can fill this need. However, we think that moral philosophers tend to focus on the capacities involved in responsibility and so tend to ignore the situational element in responsibility recognized in the criminal law literature. Our conception of responsibility brings together the dimensions of normative competence and situational control, and we factor normative competence into cognitive and volitional capacities, which we treat as equally important to normative competence and, ultimately, responsibility. Moreover, we argue that normative competence and situational control can and should be understood as expressing a common concern that blame and punishment presuppose that the agent had a fair opportunity to avoid wrongdoing. Thus, we treat the value that criminal law theorists associate with the situational element of responsibility as the umbrella concept for our conception of responsibility, one that explains the distinctive architecture of responsibility. 1 This essay is fully collaborative. The authors are listed in alphabetical order. The ideas for this essay grew out of a graduate seminar that we taught together on the topic of partial responsibility in 2008 and were refined in a seminar on responsibility that DB taught in 2011. Versions of this material were presented at

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Responsibility and Control

Cited by 1,557 publications

References 0 publications

The Most Persuasive Frankfurt Example, and What It Shows: Or Why Determinism Is Not the Greatest Threat to Moral Responsibility

The Most Persuasive Frankfurt Example, and What It Shows: Or Why Determinism Is Not the Greatest Threat to Moral Responsibility

Moral Animals and Moral Responsibility

Fairness and the Architecture of Responsibility1

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