Responsibility and Culpability in War

Abstract

This article furnishes a philosophical background for the current debate about responsibility and culpability for war crimes by referring to ideas from three important just war thinkers: Augustine, Francisco de Vitoria, and Michael Walzer. It combines lessons from these three thinkers with perspectives on current problems in the ethics of war, distinguishes between legal culpability, moral culpability, and moral responsibility, and stresses that even lower-ranking soldiers must in many cases assume moral responsibility for their acts, even though they are part of a military hierarchy and act under orders. The questions addressed in this article are arguably among the hardest and most muddled in military ethics and deserve close philosophical analysis and scrutiny.

Responsibility in Complex Conflicts: An Afghan Case

“…Walzer uses a mid-level officer's responsibility up and down the hierarchy when facing an outwards responsibility to civilians, whose lives are at stake, to illustrate the same point. 8 In their discussion of war crimes against the background of ideas from the just war tradition, Ingierd and Syse (2005) highlight three sorts of responsibility that are relevant: an individual, causal responsibility of each 25 soldier; a command responsibility; and a shared causal responsibility of those who command illegal actions and those who execute them. An important distinction is drawn between responsibility and culpability: it is not unusual to have to take responsibility for an action with negative consequences in the sense of answering for it and explaining it, but this does not necessarily mean that one has done something morally blameworthy.…”

Soldiers and ‘respect’ in complex conflicts: an Afghan case

“…Soldiers, as decision-makers, can carry responsibility for crimes of war done by themselves or done by other soldiers, if they know about the crimes and do not interfere (Ingierd and Syse 2005). The same principle is relevant in our case.…”

“…Yet knowing this is different from not respecting the situation as such by hastily grasping for role limits to 'solve' the dilemma. The difference is important, not because knowing means we are free from moral culpability in a situation (Ingierd and Syse 2005), but because knowing means we are persons capable of seeing things as they are. Knowing the moral difference, in other words, maintains an important ethical standard.…”

Military Ethics and Moral Blame across Agency Lines

“…For example, McMahan (2007b) argues that the foundation of just war theory is based in part on notions of collective responsibility. Ingierd and Syse (2005) approach the issue of culpability for the commission of atrocities by those inside the military, but direct their attention primarily to decision makers. Crawford (2007) also examines atrocities, but considers culpability in terms of the organization, the state and the public.…”