Responsibility for structural injustice

Abstract

Following Iris Marion Young, Catherine Lu allocates responsibility for transforming unjust global structures to the agents who participate in perpetuating and reproducing those structures. She also adopts Young's qualitative distinction between the 'liability' and 'social connection' models of responsibility, reserving the first for interactional injustice where identifiable victims and perpetrators are involved, and the second for structural injustice where unjust outcomes emerge without any identifiable wrongdoers. This article's argument is that Young's and Lu's specific allocation of the burden for transforming unjust global structures makes sense only if we reject the notion of a qualitative distinction between two models of responsibility and acknowledge instead that there is continuity in the conceptual tools available for thinking about responsibility for both interactional and structural injustice.

Forward‐Looking Responsibility and Political Corporate Social Responsibility

“…However, the demarcation that Young makes between the backward‐looking liability model and the forward‐looking SCM has been the subject of criticism and debate (Abdel‐Nour, 2018; Barry and Ferracioli, 2013; Barry and MacDonald, 2016; Beck, 2023; Bziuk, 2022; Atenasio, 2019; Goodin and Barry, 2021; Lu, 2018; Nussbaum, 2011; Zheng, 2019). For example, as Goodin and Barry (2021, p. 340) observe,

‘the social connection model had better have a backward‐looking blame/liability conferring aspect to it for it to be morally coherent – you cannot plausibly claim that a person has a stringent responsibility to undertake some course of conduct, but that they cannot be blamed should they fail to do so’.

…”

“…Similarly, Abdel‐Nour (2018) argues that, in accordance with Young's SCM, ‘we select as bearers of the burden to correct … an injustice those agents who participate in bringing it about’ (see also Bziuk, 2022; Lu, 2018, p. 48). Not only have some scholars drawn attention to the backward‐looking dimension of the SCM, but others have developed this line of argument further by suggesting that blameworthiness is a relevant consideration for the assignment of forward‐looking responsibility and the task of ameliorating injustice (Gould, 2009; Neuhäuser, 2014).…”

Structural Injustice and Labour Migration – From Individual Responsibility to Collective Action

“…In her application of structural injustice to colonial injustice, Catherine Lu argues that: “Agents who perpetuate structural injustice implicated in wrongdoing are not morally responsible (and blameworthy) for the wrongful conduct of others, but they are morally responsible (and blameworthy) for failing to address structural injustice and its consequences” (Lu, 2017, p. 259). However, Abdel‐Nour (2018) has found this clarification unsatisfactory and argues that a qualitative distinction between two types of injustice obscures more than it reveals, preferring a continual account. Abdel‐Nour argues that structural injustice and a liability model are not qualitatively different but implicitly rely on the same kinds of conceptual tools because both “tap into that motive of seeking to make good what we participate in making bad” (Abdel‐Nour, 2018).…”

“…However, Abdel‐Nour (2018) has found this clarification unsatisfactory and argues that a qualitative distinction between two types of injustice obscures more than it reveals, preferring a continual account. Abdel‐Nour argues that structural injustice and a liability model are not qualitatively different but implicitly rely on the same kinds of conceptual tools because both “tap into that motive of seeking to make good what we participate in making bad” (Abdel‐Nour, 2018). There is not the room here to do justice substantively to the interpretations and criticisms of Young's account, nor is this my aim.…”

Responsibility for structural injustice: A third thought

“… 46. Young (2011: 101). Even if they are not to blame, Abdel-Nour (2018: 17–18) is right to say that ‘participants in perpetuating and reproducing unjust structures…have good reason to experience something akin to the lorry driver’s agent-regret’ when he faultless runs over a child (Williams, 1981: 28). …”