Responsibility for the Past? Some Thoughts on Compensating Those Vulnerable to Climate Change in Developing Countries

Baatz, Christian

doi:10.1080/21550085.2013.768397

Cited by 60 publications

(37 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…2005, 754 -756; 2006, 467 -469). 2 For my view on compensatory duties, see Baatz (2013). 3 To take the example provided by an anonymous referee who rightly demanded more clarity on this matter: the owner of a power plant has a low individual carbon footprint, but it is also within her power to reduce the GHG emissions of the plant.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Climate Change and Individual Duties to Reduce GHG Emissions

Baatz

2014

Ethics, Policy & Environment

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Although actions of individuals do contribute to climate change, the question whether or not they, too, are morally obligated to reduce the GHG emissions in their responsibility has not yet been addressed sufficiently. First, I discuss prominent objections to such a duty. I argue that whether individuals ought to reduce their emissions depends on whether or not they exceed their fair share of emission rights. In a next step I discuss several proposals for establishing fair shares and also take practical considerations into account. I conclude that individuals should not always be obliged to reduce their emissions to what is their fair share for they may depend on carbon-intensive structures. Instead, they have a Kantian imperfect duty to reduce their emissions 'as far as can reasonably be demanded of them'. In addition, they should press governments to introduce proper regulation. At the end, I further specify both duties.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Climate Change and Individual Duties to Reduce GHG Emissions

Baatz

2014

Ethics, Policy & Environment

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“…Similar arguments in the broader context of sharing the burdens of climate justice have been presented by Page (2012) and Baatz (2013). However, the BPP is a controversial principle, even if it is limited to the idea of wrongful benefitting, which is an idea that in itself requires further elucidation (Heyward 2014;Butt 2014).…”

Section: Two Interpretations Of the Standard Argumentmentioning

confidence: 88%

Carbon Sink Conservation and Global Justice: Benefitting, Free Riding and Non-compliance

Schuppert

2015

Res Publica

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It is often assumed that in order to avoid the most severe consequences of global anthropogenic climate change we have to preserve our existing carbon sinks, such as for instance tropical forests. Global carbon sink conservation raises a host of normative issues, though, since it is debatable who should pay the costs of carbon sink conservation, who has the duty to protect which sinks, and how far the duty to conserve one's carbon sinks actually extends, especially if it conflicts with other duties one might have. According to some, forested states like Ecuador have a duty to preserve their tropical forests while the rich states of the global North have a duty of fairness to compensate states like Ecuador for the costs they incur. My aim in this paper is to critically analyse this standard line of argument and to criticise its validity both internally (i.e. with regard to its normative conclusion based on its premises) and externally (i.e. with regard to the argument's underlying assumptions and its lack of contextualisation). As I will argue, the duty to conserve one's forests is only a particular instantiation of a wider, more general duty to contribute towards global climate justice for which the context in which one operates (e.g. whether other agents are complying with their duties of global climate justice or not) matters significantly.

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“…For example, one can argue that the current benefiters from past emissions have an obligation to help those currently harmed by these emissions on the grounds of a notion of intergenerational free-riding [135] (see also [136]). Other grounds for obligations which are frequently brought forward in the sustainability context are the ability to pay (e.g., [97,137,138]), and the polluter pays principle [135].…”

Section: Claim Addresseesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Justice Dimension of Sustainability: A Systematic and General Conceptual Framework

et al. 2015

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Abstract:We discuss how the normative dimension of sustainability can be captured in terms of justice. We (i) identify the core characteristics of the concept of sustainability and discuss underlying ethical, ontological and epistemological assumptions; (ii) introduce a general conceptual structure of justice for the analysis and comparison of different conceptions of justice; and (iii) employ this conceptual structure to determine the specific characteristics and challenges of justice in the context of sustainability. We demonstrate that sustainability raises specific and partly new challenges of justice regarding the community of justice, the judicandum, the informational base, the principles, and the instruments of justice.

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Responsibility for the Past? Some Thoughts on Compensating Those Vulnerable to Climate Change in Developing Countries

Cited by 60 publications

References 23 publications

Climate Change and Individual Duties to Reduce GHG Emissions

Climate Change and Individual Duties to Reduce GHG Emissions

Carbon Sink Conservation and Global Justice: Benefitting, Free Riding and Non-compliance

The Justice Dimension of Sustainability: A Systematic and General Conceptual Framework

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