Responsive Authoritarianism in China

Abstract

How can protests influence policymaking in a repressive dictatorship? Responsive Authoritarianism in China sheds light on this important question through case studies of land takings and demolitions - two of the most explosive issues in contemporary China. In the early 2000s, landless farmers and evictees unleashed waves of disruptive protests. Surprisingly, the Chinese government responded by adopting wide-ranging policy changes that addressed many of the protesters' grievances. Heurlin traces policy changes from local protests in the provinces to the halls of the National People's Congress (NPC) in Beijing. In doing so, he highlights the interplay between local protests, state institutions, and elite politics. He shows that the much-maligned petitioning system actually plays an important role in elevating protesters' concerns to the policymaking agenda. Delving deep into the policymaking process, the book illustrates how the State Council and NPC have become battlegrounds for conflicts between ministries and local governments over state policies.

Dancing on a tightrope: The reputation management of local governments in response to public protests in China

“…Unlike democratic regimes, the authoritarian regime is characterized by strict top‐down political control (Heurlin 2016). Chinese local governments are accountable to higher‐level authorities rather than to the public (Wedeman 2001; Rothstein 2014).…”

“…Nevertheless, local governments' responses always follow the risk minimization principle. The veto power of social stability gives local government behaviour the premise of maintaining stability (Heurlin 2016). The cases in this study suggest that local governments tend to adopt the carrot and stick strategy, which has the best dual guarantee of stability maintenance and smooth implementation of the project, especially when the two kinds of pressures they perceive are both high.…”

“…They tend to quickly suppress small‐scale protests and some sensitive demands, like political reform, establishing a performative reputation to show their determination to uphold the regime legitimacy (Cai 2010). If local governments find it is difficult to strike a balance between public interests and the policy preferences of superiors, they may strictly comply with laws and regulations to avoid accountability (Lee and Zhang 2013; Heurlin 2016).…”

The politics of land property rights

“…It should be noted that the state has been aware of the insecure land rights facing farmers and made some compromises to resolve them. Heurlin (2016) finds that disruptive protests by land-losing farmers have the ability to induce the state to change policies that address the protesters’ grievances. Cai (2016) finds that some local governments have developed “land for welfare” programs whereby land-losing farmers are compensated with monthly pension payments for life in addition to cash compensation.…”

China's Political Eceonomy under Xi Jinping - The Beginning of a 'New Era'?

“…Against this backdrop, existing studies point to a significant shift with regards to state-society relations in the era of Xi Jinping. In particular, the current central party-state's governing approach towards social activism and civil society organisations is seen as substantially more coercive and repressive than that of the previous administration (under Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, 2002-2012), which had been described as a "consultative" (Teets 2013), "responsive" (Heurlin 2016) or "pragmatic" (Lai 2016) form of authoritarianism (see also Fuchs/Tse/Feng 2019). Howell and Pringle (2019), for instance, provided a useful differentiation between different "shades of authoritarianism" giving rise to particular types of state-society relations.…”