Analyses of ‘wicked problems’ often lead to recommendations for collaborative governance as a metagovernance solution. The case of deadlocked European Union genetically modified crop authorization processes offers a good example. However, the stalemate is not the result of the inherent ‘wickedness’ of the problem posed by the risk of genetic modification technology applied to agricultural production of food and feed. Rather, the policy lock-in results from the structure and dynamics of the policy network. Rigid interactions between the same institutionalized policy actors sustain instigation and power games interlaced with question–answer or probing games that jointly reproduce a clash between differently structured problems over and over again. This has created a typical wrong-problem problem situation: the EC imposing ‘safety’ and ‘consumer choice’ of GM crops as a structured problem on member states, business interests and anti-GM NGOs that, for different reasons, saw the cultivation of GM crops as an uncertain and normatively conflicted activity. Neither of the issue network’s opposing discourses and advocacy coalitions gained sufficient political power to bring their preferred problem structuring journeys to closure. Critical reflection on practices of problem structuring suggest scepticism about collaborative meta-governance and stakeholder dialogues as solutions to deal with wickedness. Instead, we argue that the European Commission’s recent coping strategy constitutes incomplete but intelligent management of relational distances in regard to a complex problem.