Restoring U.S. Power Projection Capabilities: Responding to the 2018 National Defense Strategy

Abstract

Strategy promulgated by the Trump administration in early 2018, and the largely positive reception that it has enjoyed, signals the emergence of a recognition that the capabilities of U.S. military forces have been eroding vis-à-vis those of key adversaries, especially China and Russia. 1 As a consequence, the United States' ability to deter aggression and intimidation, to assure allies, and to influence events in East Asia and Europe is being undermined. Unless steps are taken to reverse these trends, the United States could find itself playing a greatly diminished role internationally, irrespective of the strategies and intentions of this administration or its successors. The passage by Congress of a two-year budget agreement for fiscal years (FYs) 2019 and 2020 that substantially increases funding for the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) opens up the possibility of making investments in new capabilities and regional postures that can improve the ability of the United States to deter and defeat large-scale aggression by the most-threatening adversary states. But even the $165 billion in additional money that would be added to DoD's topline in the coming two years will not be sufficient to fund every worthy claimant on DoD's resources. 2 Choices will have to be made if future U.S. forces are to meet the operational challenges confronting them. This Perspective is intended to help inform those choices.

Gaining Victory in Systems Warfare: China's Perspective on the U.S.-China Military Balance

“…149 The author euphemistically refers to Taipei thus: "In the early stage of operations on the island, being able to capture or control the political center of the island first can reduce the resistance of other defenders on the island and shorten the process of large island joint offensive campaigns." 150 Specifically, in the case of urban warfare on Taiwan, the capital and political center, Taipei, must be seized and occupied to effect victory. And, more generally, pivotal cities with large populations are "a core battlefield that determines the battle situation.…”

“…149 Other analysts have argued that it will be impossible to deter or defeat PRC aggression without access to a direct defense model of large-scale, highend capabilities present in or near the theater of battle, and although avoiding escalatory mainland strikes is attractive-and, in practice, such operations may not be the most directly relevant to defeating the PLA-it may be worthwhile retaining the option to carry out such attacks if need be. 150 The PLA's goal, one expert commented, will be to either "attempt a fait accompli or force us to fight our way in, so we need to have forces in the theater." 151 The United States "might seek to put pressure on China's energy supply chains from the Middle East via a distant blockade," one interviewee noted, but "this would take resources away from the direct defense of Taiwan."…”