Restraining the fox: Minimalism in the ethics of war and peace

Abstract

Peace plays a central role in the ethics of war and peace, but this proves to be an enormous challenge. In a recent article, Elisabeth Forster and Isaac Taylor grapple with this important topic. They argue that certain concepts in just war theory—aggression, legitimacy, and peace—are essentially contested and susceptible to manipulation. Because the rules are interpreted and applied by the very states that wage war, it is as if the fox is asked to guard the chicken coop—a recipe for disaster. To avoid manipulation of the theory and make the goal of peace attainable, they defend “minimalism” in the ethics of war and peace. This paper responds to and builds on their article. After nuancing the analysis, I will argue (a) that their minimalism does not solve the problem since the proposed alternative concept is equally prone to misuse, and (b) that their minimalism is mistargeted. What I propose is to specify and ground the rules of war without raising the standard too high, to disentangle jus ad bellum and jus post bellum and see peace as guiding principle for jus post bellum, and to interpret that in a minimalist way.

Redistributive wars

“…A just cause can be "any type of wrong that would reduce a person to utter destitution." 9 I will come back to this issue in Section 4, where I will discuss the risks of a certain way of generating those intuitions.10 This Section Builds on Earlier work:Peperkamp and Tinnevelt (2021);Peperkamp (2022).11 Luban here refers to Henry Shue's notion of subsistence rights(1996, 2008, 2010, 2013). Shue, interestingly, is a strong critic of McMahan's revisionist position.…”