2013
DOI: 10.1016/j.landusepol.2012.05.002
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Result-oriented agri-environmental schemes in Europe and their potential for promoting behavioural change

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1
1
1
1

Citation Types

2
204
0
13

Year Published

2014
2014
2023
2023

Publication Types

Select...
8
1

Relationship

0
9

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 301 publications
(219 citation statements)
references
References 79 publications
2
204
0
13
Order By: Relevance
“…This means that output-based contracts are often riskier for the landowner than input-based contracts (Burton and Schwarz, 2013). Moreover, it may be more expensive for the regulator to monitor ES outputs or ecosystem assets compared to inputs.…”
Section: Figure 1 Conceptual Model Linking Ecosystem Outputs Inputs mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This means that output-based contracts are often riskier for the landowner than input-based contracts (Burton and Schwarz, 2013). Moreover, it may be more expensive for the regulator to monitor ES outputs or ecosystem assets compared to inputs.…”
Section: Figure 1 Conceptual Model Linking Ecosystem Outputs Inputs mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Hence, although this motivation was less important than the others, it does appear to play a role for many farmers. Thus, as other studies have shown (e.g., Siebert et al 2006;Burton and Schwarz 2013), financial support is a necessary prerequisite, but is not the only (or even main) motivation for farmers to carry out biodiversity-friendly management such as wood-pasture maintenance and restoration.…”
Section: Motivations Of Farmersmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…AES and associated financial incentives have often been hailed as potential solutions to stop the decline of semi-natural habitats (Ahnström et al 2008;de Snoo et al 2013). Although financial aspects are important (e.g., Siebert et al 2006;Burton and Schwarz 2013), they are not the only factors motivating land managers, and personal norms and values have also been found to play a role (Burton 2004;Siebert et al 2006;Ahnström et al 2009). It is therefore important to understand the interplay of different motivations of land managers to design effective conservation incentives (de Snoo et al 2013;Birge and Herzon 2014).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…They are more quantitative in their objectives, have measurable attributes that can be used to determine eligibility and -in turnfacilitate monitoring to assess effectiveness, and they also allow payment rates to be set in a more objective, transparent manner (refer Klimek et al, 2008;McGurn and Moran, 2013). They allow greater flexibility for farmers to innovate and achieve the environmental targets, resulting in greater uptake and a better working relationship with farmers because the payment rates are more transparent, with a reduced need for penalties (Klimek et al, 2008;Burton and Schwarz, 2013). However, there are some potential limitations associated with the payment by results approaches, particularly where delivery of positive results may be beyond the control of farmers (but this is less likely to be the case with measures for the conservation of grassland habitats) or when there…”
Section: Payment By Actions or Payment By Results?mentioning
confidence: 99%