1995
DOI: 10.1016/0951-8320(95)00016-u
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Results and insights from level-1 probabilistic safety assessments for nuclear power plants in France, Germany, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States

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Cited by 13 publications
(6 citation statements)
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“…The CDF for new designs is typically two to three orders of magnitude below the INSAG limit. Gen III/III+ BWR designs tend to have a smaller CDF than PWR designs, as already happens for current reactors [7]. Specific CDF values for Gen III/III+ designs will be presented later.…”
Section: Safety Features Of Generation Iii/iii+ Fission Reactorsmentioning
confidence: 72%
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“…The CDF for new designs is typically two to three orders of magnitude below the INSAG limit. Gen III/III+ BWR designs tend to have a smaller CDF than PWR designs, as already happens for current reactors [7]. Specific CDF values for Gen III/III+ designs will be presented later.…”
Section: Safety Features Of Generation Iii/iii+ Fission Reactorsmentioning
confidence: 72%
“…Figure 22.1 shows a graphical representation of CDF values (in events per reactor-year) for typical Gen III/III+ PWR and BWR designs, compared with the NRC requirement for current plants, a typical value for current plants, and the INSAG limit. The CDF value taken as representative for current plants is 5 × 10 −5 events per reactor-year, even if this is subjected to large variations by design and country [7]. The CDF for new designs is typically two to three orders of magnitude below the INSAG limit.…”
Section: Safety Features Of Generation Iii/iii+ Fission Reactorsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The belief that digitalized control room safety can be improved by analysis of human error or inappropriate human behaviors by an average of 60% and up to 85% of accidents in the NPP results from Werner et al (1995), and subsequently correcting the one factor that led to that accident rests on the assumption that operators can, and do, follow normative instructions of how to perform work, and that it is possible to predict up front how the operator might behave in certain situations. This study applied the analytic process of the proposed model to a MCR of the target system (see Figure 2).…”
Section: Team Errors Analysis In the Digitalized Control Roommentioning
confidence: 98%
“…According to Werner et al (1995), an average of 60% and up to 85% of accidents in nuclear power plants (NPP) result from inappropriate human behaviors. Therefore reducing system accidents resulting from human behaviors is critical for ensuring the safe operation of NPPs.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This recommendation has been widely adopted both by utilities and manufacturers for new NPPs . The CDF value taken as representative for current plants is 5×10 −5 events per reactor‐year, even if this is subjected to large variations by design and country …”
Section: Prevention and Mitigation Of Severe Accidentsmentioning
confidence: 99%