Rethinking Japan's China Policy: Japan as an Accommodator in the Rise of China, 1978–2011

Abstract

For the last four decades Sino-Japanese relations have been characterized by steadily growing economic and sociocultural interactions. Yet, greater interdependence has developed in tandem with bilateral tensions. Many analysts have attempted to explain the latter as a result of Japan trying to balance or contain the burgeoning growth of Chinese capabilities. In this article, we question and qualify this widespread understanding of Japan's response to China's rise by examining how Japan has handled China's rise between 1978 and 2011. More precisely, how has Japan dealt with China's long-term core strategic interests, which are embodied in the post-1978 Chinese “grand strategy” that is believed to have been instrumental to China's rise? Our main finding is that to a significant degree Japan has accommodated the rise of China rather than balanced against it.

Donor Competition and Public Support for Foreign Aid Sanctions

“…Naming China as Japan’s potential competition in the provision of foreign aid to other Asian countries should make the treatment quite relevant to Japanese citizens. China began to receive aid from Japan in 1979 and quickly became one of Japan’s largest aid recipients (Jerdén and Hagström 2012; Katada 2001). Public criticism, which began in the late 1990s, led Japan to suspend its concessional loans to China in 2008; by then, however, China’s phenomenal growth had facilitated its rapid military build-up and enabled Beijing to extend its ambitions to influence other countries through the provision of foreign aid.…”

The ‘abnormal’ state: Identity, norm/exception and Japan

“…Moreover, although Japanese policymakers tend to construct China's 'rise' as a threat (Hagström, 2008(Hagström, /2009Hagström and Jerdén, 2010), it does not seem reasonable to interpret Japan's China policy over the period 1978-2011 as a case of 'balancing'. Tokyo could rather be interpreted as having facilitated the successful implementation of China's grand strategy, and hence as having 'accommodated' the rise of China (Jerdén and Hagström, 2012).…”

East Asia’s Power Shift: The Flaws and Hazards of the Debate and How to Avoid Them

“…Chan's article in this special issue reminds us that policy capacity and incentives have an important bearing on whether and how capabilities translate into power. Despite the conspicuous growth of the Chinese military budget relative to Japan's, for instance, Beijing has not gotten its way in the bilateral territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands (Hagström 2012). As Karl Gustafsson shows in this special issue, the Chinese government's ability to influence Japan through the use of narratives related to the past actually seems to have decreased in recent years.…”

“…Much research has warned of self-fulfilling prophecies in the East Asian context. Some observers suggest that US or Japanese discourses about China might produce policies of containment, Japanese "normalization" and "remilitarization," and US "rebalancing" toward East Asia (Pan 2004;Hagström 2012;Turner 2014a;2014b). Nonetheless, Japan and the United States have not yet embarked on containing China.…”

“…Nonetheless, Japan and the United States have not yet embarked on containing China. Instead, both countries have on the whole accommodated China's rise (Christensen 2006;Jerdén and Hagström 2012). In a similar manner, perceived increases in bellicose or nationalistic representations in Chinese discourses led some observers to jump to the mistaken conclusion that this had already resulted in a more assertive Chinese foreign policy (Jerdén 2014).…”