Rethinking Propaganda: How State Media Build Trust Through Belief Affirmation

Abstract

Research on propaganda and censorship often focuses on strategies that autocrats can use to persuade skeptical citizens. I argue that this focus overestimates the role of persuasion in authoritarian rule, and I describe a different strategy that popular autocrats can use—affirmation propaganda—that builds credibility by speaking to citizens' existing views. Affirmation propaganda results in more positive perceptions of propaganda outlets and in skepticism about independent media. I test this argument using three studies in Russia. In two randomized experiments, I demonstrate that pro-regime citizens trust reports from state media more than reports from independent media. Additional survey evidence suggests that regime supporters deny disinformation and censorship by propaganda outlets despite often recognizing the pro-government bias of these outlets. One implication of this analysis is that independent media pose less of a challenge to authoritarian rule than previously thought. I also discuss the limitations of affirmation propaganda.

Wartime Media Monitor (WarMM-2022): A Study of Information Manipulation on Russian Social Media during the Russia-Ukraine War

“…Instead of attempting to reach war opponents or users without clear preferences, the regime's astroturf communication seems to flourish in a predominantly pro-war environment. In line with both classical research on media effects (Lazarsfeld et al, 1960) and contemporary research on the effects of propaganda in authoritarian Russia (Shirikov, 2022), these findings suggest that the main strategy of the regime's astroturf online communication might be similar to the one of authoritarian propaganda: to reinforce beliefs of those who are already proregime rather than to win new supporters.…”

Proceedings of the 7th Joint SIGHUM Workshop on Computational Linguistics for Cultural Heritage, Social Sciences, Humanities and Literature

“…Instead of attempting to reach war opponents or users without clear preferences, the regime's astroturf communication seems to flourish in a predominantly pro-war environment. In line with both classical research on media effects (Lazarsfeld et al, 1960) and contemporary research on the effects of propaganda in authoritarian Russia (Shirikov, 2022), these findings suggest that the main strategy of the regime's astroturf online communication might be similar to the one of authoritarian propaganda: to reinforce beliefs of those who are already proregime rather than to win new supporters.…”