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Relativism emerged as a significant issue in the philosophy of science as a result of the historical turn that took place in the field in the 1960s. Influenced by historical studies of science, philosophers came to see the process of scientific theory change as crucial to the understanding of science itself. Rather than focus on static relations between theory and evidence, proponents of the historical turn emphasized the profound transformations which accompany theory change. The transformations are not restricted to mere change in what theories say about the world. They extend to the method and practice of science, alter the conceptual and semantic apparatus of theories, and affect the content of scientists' perceptual experience. But in the absence of fixed elements capable of playing a neutral role in the context of theory change, it is unclear how choice between competing theories may be made on an objective basis. Because of this a relativistic account of scientific theory choice may seem to be the inevitable consequence of the historical turn in the philosophy of science. Among the most influential advocates of the historical approach to the philosophy of science were Paul Feyerabend and Thomas Kuhn, both of whom emphasized the far-reaching implications of scientific theory change. In separate publications originally published in 1962, Feyerabend and Kuhn independently proposed the thesis that successive or competing theories may be
Relativism emerged as a significant issue in the philosophy of science as a result of the historical turn that took place in the field in the 1960s. Influenced by historical studies of science, philosophers came to see the process of scientific theory change as crucial to the understanding of science itself. Rather than focus on static relations between theory and evidence, proponents of the historical turn emphasized the profound transformations which accompany theory change. The transformations are not restricted to mere change in what theories say about the world. They extend to the method and practice of science, alter the conceptual and semantic apparatus of theories, and affect the content of scientists' perceptual experience. But in the absence of fixed elements capable of playing a neutral role in the context of theory change, it is unclear how choice between competing theories may be made on an objective basis. Because of this a relativistic account of scientific theory choice may seem to be the inevitable consequence of the historical turn in the philosophy of science. Among the most influential advocates of the historical approach to the philosophy of science were Paul Feyerabend and Thomas Kuhn, both of whom emphasized the far-reaching implications of scientific theory change. In separate publications originally published in 1962, Feyerabend and Kuhn independently proposed the thesis that successive or competing theories may be
Could you begin by providing us with some historical background on what motivated the creation of the Strong Programme, and how does it relate to the creation of the Science Studies Unit at the University of Edinburgh?The Science Studies Unit pre-dated the Strong Programme. As I understand the origin of the Unit, it arose from a suggestion by the biologist C. H. Waddington that scientists should receive teaching in 'Science and Society' courses to broaden their education. The 1960s was a period where governments in this country, knowing that science was of ever-increasing significance and that scientists were therefore becoming increasingly influential, held it to be important that science education was appropriately broad, rather than overly specialised. Waddington persuaded Edinburgh University to create a Unit or Department that was to teach scientists 'Science and Society' courses. The University appointed David Edge 1 , who had moved from radio astronomy at Cambridge into the BBC, where he was doing some science broadcasting. David Edge was acquainted with people such as Thomas Kuhn, Mary Hesse, Imre Lakatos. He knew the philosophers as well as the scientists.Three appointments were made early on to the Unit, and although there was a bit of coming and going in the early years, roughly speaking, I was the philosopher of science, whilst Barry Barnes was the sociologist of science and Steve Shapin was the historian of science. I was the first appointment to the Unit, the others followed quickly on afterwards. Though there was not an 1 D. Edge (1932Edge ( -2003 fut également l'un des fondateurs de la revue Social Studies of Science, désormais centrale dans le domaine des science studies ; D.
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