Rethinking Terrorist Safe Havens: Beyond a State-Centric Approach

Abstract

Over the last decade, the term safe haven has stirred controversy both in the political arena as well as in the academic literature. Several authors have emphasised the imprecise and commonly ill-conceived use of this terminology. This article intends to provide a fresh analytical framework to better understand the notion of terrorist safe haven. Rejecting the orthodox state-centric approach that envisions terrorist safe havens solely in their static and territorial dimensions, we focus rather on the social dynamics that characterise these spaces. We contend that although they might appear socially fragmented, these geographical areas are ruled by alternative modes of governance that impose a form of social order regulating interactions among actors. We use the concept of 'social space' to capture the framework in which social interactions between local actors are taking place. While we recognise that the social order that governs a given social space imposes constraints for actors, we contend that it can be subjected to internal contestation, opening a series of opportunities for transnational terrorist networks. We then try to highlight how terrorist groups might take advantage of these internal dynamics and create new ones to ensnare some local actors into forming alliances with them. This article addresses several case studies to further illustrate the theoretical discussion. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of the importance of interpersonal relationships between local and transnational actors. While this article proposes a preliminary analysis of the question, it opens up new research avenues in conceptualising why and how some regions have come to attract transnational terrorist groups.

The Territorial Contours of Terrorism: A Conceptual Model of Territory for Non-state Violence

“…The idea of a safe haven is then only deterritorial if one remains anchored in "state-centric" notions of spatial control. 46 These critiques point toward the usefulness of territory and territoriality for understanding key aspects of terrorism and we seek to build on these ideas in order to further extend them to terrorist groups. We do this in the next section by considering the complex relationships between terror and territory for such groups and by introducing a conceptual model 9 that highlights the differences between a group's claims over territory and their functional control over territory.…”

Entering the Black Hole: The Taliban, Terrorism, and Organised Crime

“…Since the terror attacks of September 11th 2001, counterterrorism and counterinsurgency policy has been quite concerned with the notion of the black hole state, sometimes referred to as terrorist sanctuaries or safe havens (Campana and Ducol, 2011;Innes, 2007;Korteweg, 2008;Piazza, 2008). These operating spaces are troublesome inasmuch they provide terrorists opportunities to train, organise, raise revenue, and plan attacks (Piazza, 2008).…”

“…These operating spaces are troublesome inasmuch they provide terrorists opportunities to train, organise, raise revenue, and plan attacks (Piazza, 2008). Precise definitions of such terms are debatable and controversial (Campana and Ducol, 2011), but at the most basic level share the notion that in such spaces (physical or otherwise), legitimate government influence is sufficiently weak as to be unable to assert control over criminals, terrorists, or political insurgents.…”

“…To construct our theoretical extension, this article builds on observations of one such group, the Taliban movement of Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Taliban provide a useful case study for this purpose inasmuch as Makarenko (2004, p. 138) identifies Afghanistan as a failed state in her paper outlining the crime-terror continuum (as well as others; see Campana and Ducol, 2011;Groh, 2010;Innes, 2007;Korteweg, 2008;Piazza, 2008), and because both the criminal and terrorist activities of the group are well documented, as will be seen below. Begun for purely religious motivations, the terror group evolved and mutated into an organisation equally adept at organised crime.…”

“…This resistance to interference from states such as Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States is tied into a local tribal governance known as Pashtunwali (Atran, 2010;Groh, 2010). This ethnicallybased system of alternative governance relies on a decentralised tribal network (Campana and Ducol, 2011;Groh, 2010) easily leveraged by and integrated into Taliban authority. The current decentralised structure of the Taliban movement, harkening back to Pashuntwali, is entirely congruent with the norms and mores of the populace with whom the Taliban interface.…”