Rethinking the Confident Eyewitness: A Reply to Wixted, Mickes, and Fisher

Abstract

In the current issue, Wixted, Mickes, and Fisher make the claim that eyewitness memory is not inherently unreliable. They also describe specific conditions under which an eyewitness's confidence can be a reliable indicator of accuracy in the context of both recall and recognition. We argue, however, that calculating the probative value of eyewitness evidence is more complicated than the authors acknowledge. In this commentary, we raise several concerns about the collection and assessment of eyewitness confidence in the real world. We also discuss how frequently the conditions specified by Wixted et al. are met in real cases. The potential for memory contamination is commonplace and can likely be outside the control of investigators. Moreover, there is reason to doubt that legal decision makers are sensitive to the myriad ways that eyewitness memory can be influenced. Because of this, we think eyewitness-memory scientists would do well to further research the intricacies of eyewitness confidence in the real world.

In the DNA Exoneration Cases, Eyewitness Memory Was Not the Problem: A Reply to Berkowitz and Frenda (2018) and Wade, Nash, and Lindsay (2018)

“…In their commentaries, both Berkowitz and Frenda (2018; this issue, p. 336) and Wade, Nash, and Lindsay (2018; this issue, p. 339) accept our claim in principle, but they worry that, in the real world, eyewitness memory is unreliable, either because it is often contaminated before the first official test or because the police often use improper testing procedures.…”

“…A notable feature of those studies is that, in one way or another, they actually measured the reliability of eyewitness memory on an initial test (e.g., Fisher, Geiselman & Amador, 1989). Berkowitz and Frenda (2018) and Wade et al (2018) remain unconvinced by the available evidence, which is every scientist's right, but they offer no direct evidence that, on the initial test of an actual police investigation, eyewitness memory is in fact unreliable. Instead, they point to evidence that uncontaminated eyewitness memories and pristine testing conditions might be rare.…”

“…. Thus, before rethinking the confident eyewitness in the real world, asBerkowitz and Frenda (2018) would like us to do, we should wait for data showing that high-confidence eyewitness memory on an initial test in the real world actually is unreliable.…”

Prevenindo injustiças: como a psicologia do testemunho pode ajudar a compreender e prevenir o falso reconhecimento de suspeitos

“…A primeira crítica é que em casos reais é difícil ter controle sobre as diversas variáveis de sistema ou estimação que podem influenciar a confiança de uma testemunha no reconhecimento de um suspeito (Berkowitz, & Frenda, 2018;Loftus, & Greenspan, 2017;Wade, Nash, & Lindsay, 2018). Por exemplo, uma testemunha pode realizar um reconhecimento correto, ainda que esteja pouco confiante, pois o crime ocorreu há muito tempo.…”

“…A segunda crítica acerca da relação entre confiança e acurácia da memória é que ainda não há um consenso acerca de qual o método mais adequado para coletar a confiança de uma testemunha (Berkowitz, & Frenda, 2018). Uma possibilidade é documentar a confiança a partir das próprias palavras da testemunha (e.g., o quão confiante você está de que ele é o suspeito?).…”