Retribution or Reconciliation? Post‐Conflict Attitudes toward Enemy Collaborators

Abstract

Armed groups seeking to govern territory require the cooperation of many civilians, who are widely perceived as enemy collaborators after conflict ends. The empirical literature on attitudes toward transitional justice focuses heavily on fighters, overlooking more nuanced understandings of proportional justice for civilian collaborators. Through a survey experiment conducted in an Iraqi city that was controlled by the Islamic State, we find that variations in the type of collaboration an actor engages in strongly determine preferences for punishment and forgiveness. While exposure to violence is associated with a greater desire for revenge, perceived volition behind an act—a relatively unstudied factor—is much more important. This research provides unique empirical data on the microfoundations of enemy collaborator culpability. By widening our analytical lens to consider a more realistically broad spectrum of enemy collaboration, we avoid affirming a false dichotomy between victims and perpetrators that is commonly adopted in postwar settings.

What drives attitudes towards the reintegration of former fighters? Insights from a conjoint experiment in Nigeria

“…Emerging research suggests that public perceptions of offenders' intentionality and culpability are also key to reconciliation in post-ISIS Mosul (i.e. the epicenter of ISIS in Iraq; Kao & Revkin, 2021) and that safety maximization might be even more important for citizens from those communities to which ex-combatants effectively return (Littman et al, 2020). Second, we focused on a domestic, Jihadist group.…”

“…Furthermore, we also asked respondents to what extent they thought the reintegration process of all displayed ex-fighters would be successful (on a 0–10 Likert scale) and what punishment they think would be appropriate (using a multiple-choice question). Regarding the latter question, we focus on whether respondents would grant amnesty to or, conversely, sentence former fighters to death as these outcomes closely relate to the notions of forgiveness versus revenge in the criminal justice and reconciliation literature (Gibson & Gouws, 1999; Fehr, Gelfand & Nag, 2010; Kao & Revkin, 2021). These secondary outcomes serve as a preliminary test of observable implications of the mechanisms rather than a test of the mechanisms as such.…”

“…Interestingly, in this field of study, harm severity is theorized to influence forgiveness via the same two mechanisms proposed here – that is, by reinforcing (1) the idea that an offender is undeserving of forgiveness and (2) the desire to avoid similar harm in the future (McCullough, Fincham & Tsang, 2003; Fehr, Gelfand & Nag, 2010). In the realm of war and intergroup conflict, several scholars similarly find that past participation in more abusive factions and activities, such as civilian targeting (Nussio & Oppenheim, 2014), decreases ex-combatants’ self-reported levels of community acceptance (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2007), stimulates blame attributions (Gibson & Gouws, 1999), and increases civilian wariness and vengeance (Kao & Revkin, 2021). Kao & Revkin (2021) explain how the specific actions of collaborators 6 during the conflict inform perceptions of culpability which are, in turn, key to post-conflict public opinion (see also Gibson & Gouws, 1999).…”

“…In the realm of war and intergroup conflict, several scholars similarly find that past participation in more abusive factions and activities, such as civilian targeting (Nussio & Oppenheim, 2014), decreases ex-combatants’ self-reported levels of community acceptance (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2007), stimulates blame attributions (Gibson & Gouws, 1999), and increases civilian wariness and vengeance (Kao & Revkin, 2021). Kao & Revkin (2021) explain how the specific actions of collaborators 6 during the conflict inform perceptions of culpability which are, in turn, key to post-conflict public opinion (see also Gibson & Gouws, 1999).…”

“…Humphreys & Weinstein, 2007; Pugel, 2007). Consequently, existing scholarship can tell us little about the determinants of public acceptance of different types of former fighters (but see Kao & Revkin, 2021).…”