2018
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-03810-6_20
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Return of GGH15: Provable Security Against Zeroizing Attacks

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Cited by 27 publications
(11 citation statements)
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“…Note that our model allow the adversary to perform arbitrary polynomial-time computation on the output of O r (•), whereas the "weak multi-linear map model" in [11] only allows for algebraic computation of these quantities. The latter does not capture computing the norm of these quantities, as was done in the recent statistical zeroizing attacks [19].…”
Section: Our Io Candidatementioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Note that our model allow the adversary to perform arbitrary polynomial-time computation on the output of O r (•), whereas the "weak multi-linear map model" in [11] only allows for algebraic computation of these quantities. The latter does not capture computing the norm of these quantities, as was done in the recent statistical zeroizing attacks [19].…”
Section: Our Io Candidatementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Note that the idea of embedding a matrix PRF into an IO candidate already appeared in [27, Section 1.3]; however, the use of matrix PRF for "noise flooding" the encodings of zeros and the lower-order bits as in our analysis -while perfectly natural in hindsight-appears to be novel to this work. In prior works [27,11], the matrix PRF is merely used to rule out non-trivial algebraic relations amongst the encodings of zeros, namely that there is no low-degree polynomial that vanishes over a large number of pseudorandom values.…”
Section: Our Io Candidatementioning
confidence: 99%
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